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Article 3

DIALOGUE

Confrontation Under the
Marian Statutes
A RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR DAVIES
Robert Kry†
In Crawford v. Washington, Justice Scalia wrote for a
seven-Justice majority that the Confrontation Clause prohibits
admission of an absent witness’s “testimonial” statements
against a criminal defendant unless the witness is unavailable
to testify in person and the accused had a prior opportunity for
cross-examination.1 That holding was based in part on a claim
that, at the time of the framing, those two conditions governed
admissibility of pretrial examinations taken under the Marian
bail and committal statutes.2 Those two statutes—passed
during the reign of Queen Mary in the sixteenth century—
required justices of the peace to examine felony suspects and
their accusing witnesses before bailing the suspects or
committing them to jail to await trial.3 Because those Marian
examinations4 were a routine feature of felony prosecutions at

†

Associate, Baker Botts LLP. Law Clerk to Justice Antonin Scalia, 20032004, and Judge Alex Kozinski, 2002-2003. J.D., Yale Law School, 2002. The author
thanks John Beattie, John Langbein, Richard Friedman, Thomas Gallanis, and Scott
Hemphill for comments on earlier drafts. As noted, the author served as a clerk to
Justice Scalia during the term Crawford v. Washington was decided; all views
expressed, however, are the author’s own.
1
541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
2
Id. at 46-47.
3
1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554); 2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555).
4
Although the Marian bail statute also addressed depositions on coroners’
inquests, see infra notes 249-56 and accompanying text, I use the terms “Marian
examination” and “Marian deposition” throughout to refer only to committal
examinations by justices of the peace.
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the time the Sixth Amendment was framed, their admissibility
is relevant to any general theory of the Confrontation Clause.
If framing-era Marian examinations were conducted ex
parte, were admissible despite being ex parte, and were
nonetheless noncontroversial, that would be important
evidence against Crawford ’s holding. In his recent article,
What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know It?
Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington,5 Professor
Thomas Davies makes those claims.
He argues that
Crawford ’s historical analysis is flawed because the earliest
reported English cases stating that the Marian statutes did not
authorize admission of ex parte examinations were published
no earlier than May 1789, too late to have been widely
available to Americans when they drafted the Sixth
Amendment later that year.6 Davies rejects all English sources
published after or shortly before the framing and all American
sources published more than a few years after the framing as
invalid historical evidence; he finds many of those sources
ambiguous in any event.7 From earlier sources, he concludes
that a Marian examination was admissible if the witness was
unavailable, whether or not there had been an opportunity for
cross-examination.8 He relies on that conclusion as the basis
for a series of broad critiques of Crawford and originalism
generally.9
This Article responds. I argue that Crawford is well
supported by the historical evidence, and that Davies reaches a
contrary conclusion only because he ignores relevant evidence,
treats highly ambiguous sources as clearly supporting his view,
and understates the degree to which post-framing sources
reject his position. Contrary to Davies’ argument, there is a
more than adequate historical basis to conclude that the
Framers did not believe ex parte committal examinations were
admissible under the Marian statutes or their state
equivalents.10

5
Thomas Y. Davies, What Did the Framers Know, and When Did They Know
It? Fictional Originalism in Crawford v. Washington, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 105 (2005).
6
See id. at 159-61.
7
See id. at 155, 162-73, 180.
8
See id. at 108, 188-89.
9
See, e.g., id. at 206-17.
10
Although Professor Davies understands me to be making an argument
substantially different from the one Justice Scalia made in Crawford, see Thomas Y.
Davies, Revisiting the Fictional Originalism in Crawford’s “Cross-Examination Rule”: A
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Part I of this Article examines Davies’ evidence that
Marian examinations were admissible without regard to
whether the defendant had an opportunity to cross-examine. I
conclude that properly taken Marian examinations were
admissible, but that Davies’ sources show no more than that.
Part II turns to the affirmative case for the cross-examination
rule, focusing first on the prisoner’s right to be present. I
conclude that prisoners would have been routinely present
when witnesses were deposed at Marian committal hearings,
and argue that presence was widely viewed as a procedural
right by the time of the framing. Part III turns to crossexamination as such. I find that many believed a prisoner had
a right to cross-examine witnesses at his committal hearing,
but that the point was still disputed at the time of the framing.
In Part IV, I explain why the Confrontation Clause would have
been understood to resolve that dispute in favor of crossexamination.
I.

ADMISSIBILITY

Whether the Marian statutes permitted ex parte
depositions to be read against a criminal defendant is, at
bottom, a question of timing. Even setting aside the 1787,
1789, and 1791 cases whose significance Professor Davies
disputes, admissibility clearly became conditioned, at some
point, on whether the defendant had an opportunity to crossexamine. Between 1795 and 1824, for example, at least seven
English treatises11 and four English case reports12 expressly
Reply to Mr. Kry, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 557, 573-77 (2007), I believe he greatly overstates
the extent of any difference. See infra note 287.
11
See 4 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 423
(Thomas Leach ed., London 7th ed. 1795) (“[A]n examination of a person murderously
wounded, taken by a justice of the peace . . . in the absence of the prisoner, cannot be
read in evidence on the subsequent trial of the prisoner for murder, for it is taken
extrajudicially, and not as the statutes of Philip and Mary direct, in a case where the
prisoner is brought before him in custody, and he has the opportunity of contradicting
or cross-examining as to the facts alledged.”); THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE
LAW OF EVIDENCE 40-41 (London, Rider 1801) (“[I]f in a case of felony one magistrate
takes the deposition on oath of any person in the presence of the prisoner, whether the
party wounded, or even an accomplice; and the deponent dies before the trial, the
depositions may be read in evidence; but if the prisoner be not present at the time of
the examination, it cannot.”); William David Evans, On the Law of Evidence, in 2
ROBERT JOSEPH POTHIER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS, OR CONTRACTS
app. 16, at 141, 230 (William David Evans trans., London, Strahan 1806) (“[S]uch
examinations, if taken in the presence of the party charged, shall be admitted as
evidence, in case of the witness’s death in the mean time.”); S.M. PHILLIPPS, A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 277 & n.3 (London, Strahan 2d ed. 1815) (1814)
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conditioned admissibility on either an opportunity to crossexamine or the prisoner’s presence at the examination.
Similarly, between 1794 and 1858, at least sixteen reported
American cases conditioned admissibility on those criteria.13
(admissible if “taken in the presence of [the] prisoner”); 1 JOSEPH CHITTY, A PRACTICAL
TREATISE ON THE CRIMINAL LAW 79 (London, Valpy 1816) (examinations “must be done
in the presence of the party accused, in order that he may have the advantage of crossexamining the witnesses, and contradicting their testimony, or the examinations
cannot be received in evidence”); JOHN FREDERICK ARCHBOLD, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW
RELATIVE TO PLEADING AND EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES *85 (New York, Gould & Son
1st Am. ed. 1824) (1822) (“Depositions, to be thus given in evidence, must have been
taken in the presence of the prisoner, so that he might have had an opportunity of cross
examining the witness.”); 1 THOMAS STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
EVIDENCE *96 (Boston, Wells & Lilly 1st Am. ed. 1826) (1824) (“[T]he depositions of
witnesses before magistrates, under the statutes of Philip and Mary, are not evidence,
unless the prisoner had an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses . . . .”); see
also LEONARD MACNALLY, THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ON PLEAS OF THE CROWN 296-301
(Dublin, Fitzpatrick 1802) (semble).
12
See King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 n.(c)
(K.B. 1790) (reporter’s note 1797) (“Nor [are Marian depositions admissible] since that
statute, unless the party accused be present . . . .”); Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599 n.*, 599 n.*,
171 Eng. Rep. 354 n.*, 354 n.* (1814) (reported in 1818 in a note to Rex v. Wilson, Holt
597, 171 Eng. Rep. 353 (1817)) (“The intention of the statute of Philip and Mary is
sufficiently plain. It is, that the prisoner shall be present whilst the witness actually
delivers his testimony; so that he may know the precise words he uses, and observe
throughout the manner and demeanour with which he gives his testimony.”); Rex v.
Smith, Holt 614, 615, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360 (1817) (reported 1818) (“Undoubtedly,
. . . the decisions established the point, that the prisoner ought to be present, that he
might cross-examine.”); Rex v. Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 210-11 & n.(a), 171 Eng. Rep. 622,
623 & n.(a) (1817) (reported 1820) (similar); see also Rex v. Smith, Russ. & Ry. 339, 340
n.(c), 168 Eng. Rep. 834, 835 n.(c) (1817) (reported 1825) (endorsing “Mr. Starkie’s
excellent note” on the case).
13
See State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Super. L. 1794) (state felony
committal statute “clearly implies the depositions to be read, must be taken in [the
prisoner’s] presence,” so that he has “liberty to cross examine”); State v. Moody, 3 N.C.
(2 Hayw.) 31, 31-32 (Super. L. 1798) (Haywood, J.) (conditioning admissibility on
whether the deposition was “regularly taken pursuant to the act . . . ; more especially
[i.e., more specifically] if the party to be affected by that testimony were present at the
examination”); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58, 59-60 (1821) (admitting
deposition taken “under proper circumstances,” i.e., “in the presence of the prisoner”);
State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 608-11 (App. L. 1835) (“[I]f the accused is present
and has an opportunity of cross examining the witness, the depositions, according to
the rule, are admissible in evidence. . . . [N]o rule would be productive of more mischief
than that which would allow the ex parte depositions of witnesses, and especially in
criminal cases, to be admitted in evidence.”); Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18
Pick.) 434, 437 (1836) (deposition before committing magistrate admissible because
“the defendant did meet the witness who has deceased, face to face, and might have
cross-examined him before the magistrate touching this accusation”); People v. Restell,
3 Hill 289, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (“The deposition [under the Marian statutes] must
not only be taken in a judicial proceeding, but it must be taken when the defendant is
present and has the opportunity to cross-examine the witness; otherwise it will not be
received.”); Bostick v. State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344, 344-45 (1842) (“It is certain that
such a deposition, taken in the absence of the prisoner, and where he had no
opportunity to cross-examine the witness, could not be read in evidence against
him . . . .”); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 130 (App. L. 1844) (“Neither the
[Marian statutes nor their state equivalent] has any express provision, that the
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Were these authorities representative of the public
understanding of the confrontation right at the time the Sixth
Amendment was adopted? Or do they represent post-framing
developments? Professor Davies takes the latter view.14 He
reaches that conclusion in large part because he refuses to
consider English sources published after 1789 and American
sources published more than a few years after the framing as
evidence of original meaning—a limitation I consider in due
course.15 But he also relies on pre-framing sources which, he
contends, show that Marian examinations “were understood to
be admissible in felony trials, without regard to whether there
had been an opportunity for cross-examination, if a witness
became unavailable prior to trial.”16 I evaluate that claim here.
Davies’ evidence falls into two categories. The first
consists of statements in treatises and manuals, most notably
Sir Matthew Hale’s, to the effect that a Marian examination
was admissible if the witness was dead, too sick to travel, or
kept away by the accused. The second consists of the 1696
depositions shall go to the jury in any case. But the Statute P. & M. has been so
expounded:—Provided the accused was present, and had the opportunity of a crossexamination, and the witness be dead, &c.”); State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658, 669 (1845)
(admitting magistrate’s testimony because proceedings were “adversary” (emphasis
omitted)); Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749, 753 (1849) (“[D]epositions taken before the
examining court, in the presence of, and on cross-examination by, the prisoner . . . are
received as evidence, if the witnesses are dead.”); Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354, 357
(1850) (committal examination admissible if “the witness was duly sworn by competent
authority and the accused had the opportunity of cross-examining him”); Kendrick v.
State, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 479, 487 (1850) (committal examination admissible because
“evidence of the deceased witness was given on oath before the committing court, in the
presence of the accused, who had the right to cross-examine”); United States v.
Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1134 (C.C.D. Ill. 1851) (No. 15,702) (examination admissible
“provided the defendant was present, had the liberty to cross-examine, and the witness
was dead”); Collier v. State, 13 Ark. 676, 678 (1853) (examination inadmissible where
the record “fail[s] to show that the prisoner was present at the examination”); State v.
McO’Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 414-15 (1857) (admitting “deposition of a witness regularly
taken in a judicial proceeding against the accused in respect to the same transaction
and in his presence”); State v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 438 (1858) (deposition admissible
only if taken “in the presence of the accused, when an opportunity for crossexamination is afforded”); cf. Dunwiddie v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 290, 290
(1808) (“It appears to this court to be unnecessary to enter into any reasoning to show
the impropriety of the decision of the inferior court. It is sufficient to say, that the
principle decided by that court, viz. ‘That in the case of bastardy, the warrant before
the justice ought to be received as evidence by the court, of the person charged being
the father of the child,’ is a violation of the most fundamental rules of evidence;
withholds from the person accused an advantage which was most unquestionably his
right—the benefit of a cross examination; and, if admitted, it would also confine to a
justice of the peace, the exclusive right of inquiring into the truth of the fact charged.”).
14
See Davies, supra note 5, at 118-19.
15
See id. at 155, 180.
16
Id. at 108.
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Paine decision and subsequent interpretations of that case in
treatises and manuals. I discuss each category in turn.
A.

Hale and the Unavailability Rule

The Marian statutes required justices of the peace to
examine felony suspects and witnesses at committal hearings,17
and also included similar provisions for coroners’ inquests.18
The results were to be certified to the court, but the statutes
said nothing about whether they were meant to take the place
of trial testimony.19 That question fell to judicial construction
when Lord Morly was tried for murder before the House of
Lords in 1666 after killing his opponent in a duel.20 The judges
convened before trial to decide how to advise the House on
evidentiary questions expected to arise, among them the
admissibility of certain depositions taken by the coroner.21
They resolved that a deposition was admissible if the witness
was dead, too sick to travel, or kept away by the accused, but
not otherwise.22
17
See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (“And that the said Justices or one of
them being of the Quorum, when any such prisoner is brought before them for any
Manslaughter or Felony, before any Bailment or Mainprise, shall take the examination
of the said Prisoner and information of them that brings him, of the fact and
circumstances thereof, and the same, or as much thereof as shall be material to prove
the felony, shall put in writing before they make the same Bailment . . . .”); 2 & 3 Phil.
& M., c. 10 (1555) (“That from henceforth such Justices or Justice before whom any
person shall be brought for Manslaughter or Felony, or for suspicion thereof, before he
or they shall commit or send such Prisoner to Ward, shall take the examination of such
Prisoner, and information of those that bring him, of the fact and circumstance thereof,
and the same or as much thereof as shall be material to prove the Felony shall put in
writing, within two days after the said examination . . . .”). I have altered the spelling
in all quotations from Statutes of the Realm.
18
See 1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554) (“And that every Coroner, upon any
Inquisition before him found, whereby any person or persons shall be indicted for
murder or manslaughter, or as accessory or accessories to the same before the murder
or manslaughter committed, shall put in writing the effect of the evidence given to the
Jury before him being material . . . .”).
19
The statutes’ intent in that regard has long been debated. See, e.g., Rex v.
Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 211 n.(a), 171 Eng. Rep. 622, 623 n.(a) (1817) (reporter’s note
1820) (observing that the statutes “seem to have been passed without any direct
intention on the part of the legislature, to use the examinations and depositions as
evidence upon the trials of felons”); JOHN H. LANGBEIN, PROSECUTING CRIME IN THE
RENAISSANCE 24-34 (1974) (contending that “the Marian draftsman did not intend to
institute a system of written evidence”).
20
Lord Morly’s Case, Kel. 53, 84 Eng. Rep. 1079 (1666) (also reported as Lord
Morley’s Case, 6 How. St. Tr. 769 (H.L. 1666)).
21
See id. at 53-55, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1079-80.
22
See id. at 55, 84 Eng. Rep. at 1080 (“[I]n case any of the witnesses which
were examined before the coroner, were dead or unable to travel, and oath made
thereof, . . . the examinations of such witnesses, so dead or unable to travel might be
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Lord Morly’s case involved coroners’ depositions, but
that “unavailability rule” was extended to committal
examinations as well. Sir Matthew Hale, one of the judges who
had presided at Lord Morly’s case, wrote in his History of the
Pleas of the Crown that “examinations and informations thus
taken and returned may be read in evidence against the
prisoner, if the informer be dead, or so sick, that he is not able
to travel, and oath thereof made; otherwise not.”23 As Davies
notes, similar statements appear in treatises by William
Hawkins and Francis Buller, and in colonial manuals for
justices of the peace.24
Professor Davies relies on those statements to argue
that Marian depositions “were understood to be admissible in
felony trials, without regard to whether there had been an
opportunity for cross-examination, if a witness became
unavailable prior to trial.”25 He concludes that absence of
opportunity to cross-examine had no effect on the admissibility
of depositions of unavailable witnesses in founding-era
criminal trials.26 Those conclusions, however, do not follow.
Rather, they rest on implicit assumptions about Marian
procedure.
If the right to confrontation prohibited ex parte
depositions at trial, there are two ways in which Marian
procedure could be consistent with that right. First, a trial
court could condition the admissibility of a Marian examination
on whether the accused had an opportunity to cross-examine at
the committal hearing.
In that case, even if Marian
examinations were often taken ex parte, they would not
contravene the cross-examination rule, because ex parte
examinations would be excluded at trial.
Second, an
opportunity for cross-examination could be a natural or routine
feature of a committal hearing. In that case, it would not
matter whether a trial court conditioned admissibility on
opportunity to cross-examine. That opportunity would be a
read, the coroner first making oath that such examinations are the same which he took
upon oath, without any addition or alteration whatsoever.”); see also Bromwich’s Case,
1 Lev. 180, 180, 83 Eng. Rep. 358, 358 (K.B. 1666) (“[T]he depositions of two other
witnesses taken before the coroner, which were now dead, were read to the same effect,
as they were read before the lords on the trial of the Lord Morly, by the opinion of all
the Judges of England.”).
23
2 MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 284 (Sollom
Emlyn ed., London, Nutt & Gosling 1736).
24
See Davies, supra note 5, at 146-52, 182-86.
25
Id. at 108.
26
Id.
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consequence of the way an examination was normally
conducted.
Professor Davies acknowledges the distinction between
those two forms of consistency late in his article.27 But he
largely ignores its significance for the unavailability rule. That
rule addressed the conditions under which a Marian
examination was admissible, not the manner in which an
examination was normally conducted.
That a Marian
examination was admissible if the witness was unavailable
does not show that ex parte examinations would routinely be
admitted. It would show that only if Marian examinations
were routinely conducted ex parte.
Nor does the unavailability rule necessarily show that
opportunity to cross-examine was not a condition of
admissibility. The rule says nothing about cross-examination
one way or the other; Davies must rely on a negative inference
drawn from that omission. The strength of that inference,
however, depends entirely on how Marian examinations were
normally conducted. If they were often taken ex parte, the
negative-inference argument has some force. If they were not,
the argument is much weaker; opportunity to cross-examine
could then simply be implicit in the fact that a deposition was
properly taken under the Marian statutes.28
27

The distinction is reflected in his “strong” and “nuanced” interpretations of
Crawford ’s description of the 1787, 1789, and 1791 decisions. See id. at 162-78.
28
Although many treatises and manuals state the unavailability rule in
terms similar to Hale’s, some arguably provide more support for Professor Davies’
position. For example, Buller’s treatise states:
It is a general Rule, that Depositions taken in a Court not of Record shall not
be allowed in Evidence elsewhere. So it has been holden in Regard to
Depositions in the ecclesiastical Court, though the Witnesses were dead. So
where there cannot be a Cross-Examination, as Depositions taken before
Commissioners of Bankrupts, they shall not be read in Evidence; yet if the
Witnesses examined on a Coroner’s Inquest be dead, or beyond Sea, their
Depositions may be read; for the Coroner is an Officer appointed on Behalf of
the Public, to make Enquiry about the Matters within his Jurisdiction; and
therefore the Law will presume the Depositions before him to be fairly and
impartially taken.—And by [the Marian statutes] Justices of the Peace shall
examine of Persons brought before them for Felony, and of those who brought
them, and certify such Examination to the next Gaol-Delivery; but the
Examination of the Prisoner shall be without Oath, and the others upon
Oath, and these Examinations shall be read against the Offender upon an
Indictment, if the Witnesses be dead.
FRANCIS BULLER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW RELATIVE TO TRIALS AT NISI PRIUS
342 (Dublin 1768). Burn’s manual includes a similar passage, although it combines the
references to coroners’ depositions and committal examinations while omitting the
rationale for admissibility of coroners’ depositions. See 1 RICHARD BURN, THE JUSTICE
OF THE PEACE, AND PARISH OFFICER 336 (London, Woodfall & Strahan 1764). Davies
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Authorities before and after the framing confirm that
Hale and other proponents of the unavailability rule were
widely understood not to have suggested that an unavailable
witness’s Marian deposition was admissible regardless of the
circumstances under which it was taken. An early example
comes from the 1696 debates over Sir John Fenwick’s bill of
The
attainder for treason in the House of Commons.29
prosecution sought to admit the examination of an unavailable
witness taken in Fenwick’s absence.
Fenwick’s counsel
opposed admission because Fenwick was not “present or privy”
and thus had “no opportunity . . . to cross-examine the
person.”30 Counsel contended that such examinations were
“never admitted” in “criminal cases” and that “it was never
attempted in any court of justice, that the examination of
witnesses behind a man’s back, could be read in any place
whatsoever.”31
Debate ensued among Members of Parliament. One
disputed counsel’s broad claim that ex parte examinations were
inadmissible in criminal cases by invoking Hale’s discussion of
the Marian statutes: “No less a man than my L. C. Justice
Hales . . . in his Pleas of the Crown . . . says; First, by the
[Marian statutes], the justice hath power to examine the
offender and informer; and . . . these examinations, if the party

argues that the contrast these sources draw to bankruptcy depositions, which were
inadmissible due to inability to cross-examine, implies that cross-examination was not
a condition of admissibility for committal examinations. See Davies, supra note 5, at
151; Davies, supra note 10, at 591-93. But these sources offer Davies only ambiguous
support. First, it is not clear that the words “yet” and “but” draw a comparison based
on admissibility despite inability to cross-examine rather than admissibility
generally—one could certainly say, for example, that “bankruptcy depositions are
inadmissible because cross-examination is impossible ‘yet’ (or ‘but’) Marian
examinations are admissible precisely because cross-examination is possible.” (Buller’s
inclusion of a rationale for admissibility of coroners’ depositions makes it unlikely he
intended that meaning, but Burn’s manual is more ambiguous.) Second, it is not clear
that the “yet” in Buller’s passage applies to the entire remainder of the paragraph,
rather than just the remainder of the sentence addressing coroners’ depositions. The
final sentence addressing committal examinations could merely be a resumption of the
paragraph’s survey of the admissibility of various types of depositions.
29
13 How. St. Tr. 537 (H.C. 1696). Fenwick was charged with treason, not
felony, so the Marian statutes did not apply. Nevertheless, the debates are relevant.
30
Id. at 591 (Powys); see also id. at 592 (“[I]f that should be allowed for
evidence, then what is sworn behind a man’s back, in any case whatsoever, may as well
be produced as evidence against him . . . .”).
31
Id. at 592 (Shower); see also id. (“[N]o deposition of a person can be read,
though beyond sea, unless in cases where the party it is to be read against was privy to
the examination, and might have cross-examined him, or examined to his credit, if he
thought fit; it was never pretended, depositions could be read upon other
circumstances.”).
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be dead or absent, may be given in evidence.”32 Another
Member responded, however, that Hale’s rule applied only
when the examination was taken in the prisoner’s presence
(and then only in felony cases): “I don’t think [counsel] were
ignorant of the case quoted out of my L. C. J. Hales, but they
thought it was not applicable to this business before the House;
but only related to felonies, and when depositions were taken in
the presence of the party.”33
Davies relegates Fenwick’s case to a footnote because he
“know[s] of no evidence [the Framers] were conversant with”
it.34 But the case was plainly available to them; Crawford cites
Howell’s 1812 report, but the same report appears in earlier
editions of the State Trials as far back as 1719.35 Several
colonial libraries had copies of the State Trials,36 and scholars
have assumed the Framers were familiar with their contents.37
Fenwick’s case in particular is discussed and cited to the State
Trials by both Blackstone and Hawkins.38 The case shows that,
even as early as 1696, there was disagreement over whether
Hale’s rule implied that the Marian deposition of an
unavailable witness was admissible regardless of the
circumstances under which it was taken.
A 1794 North Carolina decision, State v. Webb, is also
instructive.39 There, the Attorney General invoked the state’s
equivalent of the Marian statutes in seeking to admit an
unavailable witness’s deposition taken ex parte. He cited the
passages from Hale, Hawkins, and Buller on which Davies

32

Id. at 596 (Sloane). Hale’s History of the Pleas of the Crown was not
published until 1736; Sloane is referring to Hale’s earlier Summary. See Davies, supra
note 5, at 129-30 & n.80.
33
Id. at 602 (Musgrave) (emphasis added).
34
Davies, supra note 5, at 121-22 n.50.
35
See 4 A COMPLEAT COLLECTION OF STATE-TRYALS, AND PROCEEDINGS UPON
IMPEACHMENTS FOR HIGH TREASON, AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANOURS 232,
256-63 (Thomas Salmon ed., London 1719).
36
See RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 87
n.160 (1973).
37
See, e.g., id. (“[I]t is not to be presumed that [the Framers] were ignorant of
the famous State Trials.”).
38
See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
351 (Oxford, Clarendon Press 1769); 2 WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF
THE CROWN 428 & n.(a), 430 (London, Nutt & Gosling 1721).
39
2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (Super. L. 1794).
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relies.40 But the court rejected his interpretation of those
authorities:
These authorities do not say that depositions taken in the absence of
the prisoner shall be read, and our [committal statute] clearly
implies the depositions to be read, must be taken in his presence: it
is a rule of the common law, founded on natural justice, that no man
shall be prejudiced by evidence which he had not the liberty to cross
examine; and though it be insisted that the act intended to make an
exception in this instance, to the rule of the common law, yet the act
has not expressly said so, and we will not by implication derogate
from the salutary rule established by the common law.41

Webb thus expressly conditioned admissibility on an
opportunity for cross-examination; and it viewed that
condition, not as departing from the unavailability rule, but as
consistent with that rule.42
Subsequent cases and treatises that conditioned
admissibility on presence or opportunity for cross-examination
uniformly interpreted the earlier sources in that fashion—as
stating that unavailability was a condition of admissibility but
not implying that the deposition of an unavailable witness was
admissible regardless of the manner in which it was taken. An
1818 case report, for example, cited Hale and Hawkins for the
40
Id. at 103-04 (“and cited in support of this attempt, 2 H.H.P.C. 284 [Hale’s
History of the Pleas of the Crown]. H.P.C. 429 [Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown]. Bull.
252 [Buller’s Nisi Prius]. La. Evid. 140, 142. 3 Term Rep. 713 [Eriswell].”).
41
Id. at 104.
42
Despite having previously acknowledged that Webb supports Crawford ’s
cross-examination rule, see Davies, supra note 5, at 181-82, Davies now claims the case
is inapposite because the witness was not “genuinely unavailable,” see Davies, supra
note 10, at 627-28. His new interpretation, however, is implausible. Although the
report never expressly states that the witness was unavailable, the case was obviously
argued and decided on that premise. The Attorney General clearly thought the witness
was unavailable because the authorities he relied on expressly conditioned
admissibility on unavailability. See supra note 40. His argument makes no sense if
the witness was available. And the court’s holding had nothing to do with availability;
rather, the court held that the state’s equivalent of the Marian statutes “clearly
implie[d]” that witnesses must be examined “in [the prisoner’s] presence” at the
committal hearing (so that the prisoner had “liberty to cross examine”), and for that
reason, “[t]hese authorities” on which the Attorney General relied—which, again, relate
only to unavailable witnesses—“do not say that depositions taken in the absence of the
prisoner shall be read.” Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 104. Furthermore, the court’s
rationale—that the committal statute itself “clearly implie[d]” a right to be present at
the committal hearing—necessarily applied to witnesses who later became unavailable
to testify at trial, since there is typically no way to predict which witnesses will become
unavailable at the time the prisoner exercises his right to be present at the committal
hearing. In short, Davies dismisses Webb only by attributing a nonsensical argument
to the prosecutor and ignoring the court’s express holding in favor of a rationale the
court said nothing about. I am certainly willing to admit that some of the sources I
rely on are ambiguous, but this is not one of them.
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point that “it seems now to be settled” that a Marian deposition
was admissible if “the informant is dead, or not able to travel,
or . . . kept away by the means and contrivance of the prisoner,”
but also stated that it was “plain” under the Marian statutes
that “the prisoner shall be present whilst the witness actually
An 1814 treatise cited Hale,
delivers his testimony.”43
Hawkins, and Buller for the point that a Marian deposition
was admissible if the witness was unavailable, but said the
rule applied only to an examination taken “in the presence of
[the] prisoner.”44 An 1816 treatise cited Hale, Hawkins, and
Buller for the unavailability rule, but also stated that
examinations “must be done in the presence of the party
accused, in order that he may have the advantage of crossexamining the witnesses.”45 And an 1822 treatise cited Hale’s
unavailability rule but stated that “[d]epositions, to be thus
given in evidence, must have been taken in the presence of the
prisoner, so that he might have had an opportunity of cross
examining the witness.”46
The unavailability rule stated in Lord Morly’s case was
construed the same way. An 1808 treatise, commenting on an
earlier claim that Lord Morly’s case proved the admissibility of
ex parte coroners’ depositions, stated: “Mr. J. Buller is reported
to have said that it was so settled in [Lord Morly’s case and a
companion case]; certainly nothing of the kind appears in those
books.”47 And an 1844 decision characterized Lord Morly’s case
as “quite uncertain, as to the precise point of the absence of the
accused at the taking of the depositions,” and stated that it
could not “conceive how judges could have resolved, that the
depositions of deceased witnesses, when examined by the
coroner, should be received as competent evidence . . . but by
assuming that the written testimony had been taken under all
the guards and tests of the common law, and especially those of
the cross-examination.”48

43
Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599 n.*, 599-600 n.*, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 n.*, 354-55 n.*
(1814) (reported 1818).
44
PHILLIPPS, supra note 11, at 277 & nn.1-7.
45
1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79-81 & nn.(w)-(y).
46
ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85.
47
THOMAS PEAKE, A COMPENDIUM OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 64 n.(m)
(London, Hanfard & Sons 3d ed. 1808); see also 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *490
(similar). Peake was commenting on Buller’s opinion in Eriswell, as to which see infra
notes 128-44 and accompanying text.
48
State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 127, 131-32 (App. L. 1844).
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Of course, these post-framing interpretations were not
available to the Framers in 1789 or 1791. But that does not
make them irrelevant. The way that Hale, Hawkins, and
Buller were understood in 1794 or even 1822 is some evidence
of how they were understood at the time of the framing—not
conclusive evidence, but better evidence (temporally speaking)
than the way Professor Davies (or even Justice Scalia) might
interpret them today. Those later sources show that the
unavailability rule was widely understood not to imply that the
Marian deposition of an unavailable witness was admissible
regardless of the circumstances under which it was taken.
B.

Paine and the Felony/Misdemeanor Distinction

Professor Davies’ other line of authority consists of the
1696 decision in King v. Paine49 and later commentaries on that
case by Hawkins, Geoffrey Gilbert, and American manuals
quoting Hawkins. Paine was charged with criminal libel, a
misdemeanor.
He was represented by Sir Bartholomew
Shower, who (perhaps not coincidentally) was also defense
counsel in Fenwick’s case.50 The Crown sought to admit the ex
parte examination of a dead witness who had implicated Paine.
The court rejected the evidence, but the rationale for its
decision differs across the five reports of the case.
In the Modern Reports, defense counsel argued that the
examination was inadmissible because “the defendant had lost
all opportunity of cross-examining” and “this case was not like
an information before a coroner, or an examination by justices
of peace of persons accused, and afterwards committed for
felony, because they have power by a particular statute to take
such examinations both of the fact and circumstances, and to
put it in writing and certify it at the next general gaol
49
There are five reports of the evidentiary decision in the case: King v.
Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B. 1696); Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 90 Eng. Rep.
527 (K.B. 1697); Rex v. Pain, Holt 294, 90 Eng. Rep. 1062 (K.B. 1697); Rex v. Paine, 1
Salk. 281, 91 Eng. Rep. 246 (K.B. 1696); and Rex v. Payne, Ld. Raym. 729, 91 Eng.
Rep. 1387 (K.B. n.d.). Paine is customarily dated to January 1696 (i.e., Hilary Term,
7 Will. 3), as reported by Modern and Salkeld, see, e.g., 3 JOHN H. WIGMORE, A
TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW
§ 1364, at 22 & n.53 (2d ed. 1923), but there is reason to believe that Comberbach and
Holt’s date of 1697 is the correct one. If Paine had been decided in January 1696, it
surely would have been mentioned in the debates in Fenwick’s case later that year,
especially since the same lawyer represented both defendants. See infra note 50 and
accompanying text; cf. 3 WIGMORE, supra, § 1364, at 22 n.53.
50
Compare Pain, Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527, with Fenwick’s Case, 13
How. St. Tr. 537, 592-93 (H.C. 1696).
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delivery.”51 The prosecutor responded that “the statute makes
no difference in this case, for the power of a justice of peace to
take examinations is not grounded upon it; for he might
examine a criminal by virtue of his office.”52 The court held
simply that “these depositions should not be given in evidence,
the defendant not being present when they were taken before
the mayor, and so had lost the benefit of a cross-examination.”53
According to the Comberbach and Holt reports, the
examination was inadmissible “for two reasons”: “1. It appears,
that the defendant was not present when the examination was
taken, so that he could not cross-examine him. 2. There is a
difference between capital offences and cases of misdemeanour,
for in case of felony the justices are by the [Marian statutes] to
take the examinations in writing, and certify them to the gaoldelivery, &c. and if the party be dead or absent, they may be
given in evidence.”54 Finally, the Salkeld and Lord Raymond
reports rely on the Marian statutory limitation to felonies
without mentioning cross-examination.55
Read together, the five reports suggest that two
factors—the absence of opportunity to cross-examine and the
Marian statutory limitation to felonies—were both relevant to
the outcome. But the reports leave unclear how those two
strands of analysis relate to each other. One reading—
Professor Davies’—is that they were interrelated grounds for
decision: The examination was inadmissible because it was
taken outside the authority of the Marian statutes, and nonMarian examinations were admissible (if at all) only upon a
prior opportunity for cross-examination.56 On that reading,
Paine’s distinction between felonies and misdemeanors
arguably does support the claim that Marian examinations
were admissible without regard to opportunity for crossexamination.

51

5 Mod. at 164, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585.
Id.
53
Id. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585.
54
Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527; Holt at 294, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062.
55
1 Salk. at 281, 91 Eng. Rep. at 246 (“[I]n cases of felony such depositions
before a justice, if the deponent die, may be used in evidence by the [Marian statutes].
But this cannot be extended farther than the particular case of feleny [sic], and
therefore not to this case.”); Ld. Raym. at 730, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1387 (“[I]n indictments
for felony, by [the Marian statutes] such informations may be read, the deponent being
dead. But in indictments or informations for misdemeanors, or in civil actions, or
appeals of murder, no such information can be given in evidence . . . .”).
56
See Davies, supra note 5, at 140-43.
52
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Another interpretation, however, is that the two
grounds for decision were independent: The examination was
excluded both because there was no opportunity for crossexamination and because there was no statutory authority to
take examinations in misdemeanor cases, either ground alone
being sufficient to exclude. In other words, misdemeanor
examinations were never admissible, regardless of how they
were taken; felony examinations were admissible, but only if
there was an opportunity for cross-examination.
The
“difference” between felony and misdemeanor examinations
was not that felony examinations were admissible even if ex
parte, but simply that they were admissible at all.
Comberbach and Holt do speak of “two reasons” why the
examination was excluded, suggesting those reasons were
alternative grounds for decision.57 And every report that
addresses the felony/misdemeanor distinction does so in
connection with the authority-to-examine issue, not the crossexamination issue.58 Davies himself interprets Paine to hold
that examinations were never admissible in misdemeanor
cases.59 But he thereby undermines his other argument that

57

Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at 527; Holt at 294, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062.
Comberbach and Holt address the “difference” between Marian and
misdemeanor examinations in their discussions of authority to examine, not their
separate references to opportunity to cross-examine. Comb. at 359, 90 Eng. Rep. at
527; Holt at 294, 90 Eng. Rep. at 1062. Salkeld and Lord Raymond (who stake the
decision solely on authority grounds) report the court’s distinction between Marian and
misdemeanor examinations; Modern (which stakes the decision solely on crossexamination) does not. Compare 1 Salk. at 281, 91 Eng. Rep. at 246, and Ld. Raym. at
730, 91 Eng. Rep. at 1387, with 5 Mod. at 165, 87 Eng. Rep. at 585. The only passage
in any report that even arguably connects the Marian/misdemeanor difference to the
cross-examination rule is defense counsel’s argument in Modern. See 5 Mod. at 164, 87
Eng. Rep. at 585 (examination inadmissible because “the defendant had lost all
opportunity of cross-examining him; that this case was not like an information before a
coroner, or an examination by justices of peace of persons accused, and afterwards
committed for felony, because they have power by a particular statute to take such
examinations both of the fact and circumstances, and to put it in writing and certify it
at the next general gaol delivery”). Even that passage is ambiguous, however, and
since Paine’s counsel was the same lawyer who argued in Fenwick’s case that ex parte
examinations were “never admitted” in “criminal cases” and that it was “never
attempted in any court of justice, that the examination of witnesses behind a man’s
back, could be read in any place whatsoever,” 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 592 (H.C. 1696), it
seems unlikely he meant to concede the admissibility of ex parte Marian examinations
in Paine. More probably, he was arguing that the examination was inadmissible both
because “the defendant had lost all opportunity of cross-examining” and because “this
case was not like an information before a coroner, or an examination by justices of
peace of persons accused, and afterwards committed for felony.” 5 Mod. at 164, 87 Eng.
Rep. at 585.
59
Davies, supra note 5, at 137-40. Davies attributes the contrary view to
Justice Scalia, id. at 137, apparently because Crawford states that “admissibility . . .
58
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Paine shows Marian examinations were admissible even absent
opportunity to cross-examine: If misdemeanor examinations
were never admissible, they were “differen[t]” from felony
examinations, whether or not the cross-examination rule
applied to the latter.
Furthermore, if misdemeanor
examinations were never admissible and felony examinations
were always admissible, it is hard to see why Paine bothered to
say anything about cross-examination at all.
Several English authorities read Paine in precisely the
fashion suggested here. An 1814 treatise, for example, cited
the Modern version of Paine for the point that a Marian
examination had to be taken “in the presence of [the]
prisoner.”60 It then cited the Lord Raymond version for the
point that an examination “cannot be given in evidence on an
indictment for a misdemeanor” at all.61 Similarly, an 1816
treatise cited Modern for the point that Marian examinations
“must be done in the presence of the party accused, in order
that he may have the advantage of cross-examining the
witnesses,”62 while citing Modern, Salkeld, Comberbach, and
Lord Raymond for the point that “the depositions cannot, in
any case, be given in evidence on an indictment for a
misdemeanour.”63
depended on whether the defendant had had an opportunity to cross-examine.”
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 45 (2004).
60
PHILLIPPS, supra note 11, at 277 & n.3.
61
Id. at 278 & n.2.
62
1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79 & n.(l).
63
Id. at 81 & n.(a); see also Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 48 & n.(a), 107
Eng. Rep. 15, 19 & n.(a) (K.B. 1822) (reporter’s note to counsel’s argument) (citing
Salkeld and Modern for the point that a Marian deposition may “be read in evidence
against the prisoner, on the ground that he has had the opportunity for [a] crossexamination”); ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85 (citing Modern, Salkeld, and Lord
Raymond for the point that a Marian examination, “to be thus given in evidence, must
have been taken in the presence of the prisoner, so that he might have had an
opportunity of cross examining the witness,” while citing Salkeld for the point that an
examination cannot “be read in the case of misdemeanors, at all; the statute extending
only to manslaughter and felony”). Other English authorities read Paine as holding
that misdemeanor examinations were never admissible, and also stated that ex parte
felony examinations were inadmissible, without attributing that latter point to Paine.
An 1820 reporter’s note cited Paine for the point that “examinations and depositions
taken in a case of misdemeanour, cannot be read in evidence, because the statutes
apply to cases of felony only.” Rex v. Smith, 2 Stark. 208, 211 n.(a), 171 Eng. Rep. 622,
623-24 n.(a) (1817). But even Marian examinations, the author added, became
admissible only “upon the rules and principles of evidence already established,” and
admissibility at common law depended on “an opportunity to cross-examine.” Id.
Likewise, an 1801 treatise cited Paine for the point that examinations were never
admissible in misdemeanor cases, but stated in the preceding sentence that a felony
examination was inadmissible “if the prisoner be not present at the time of the
examination.” PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, at 41.
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American authorities read Paine the same way. An
1835 South Carolina case relied on it to conclude that the
Marian statutes did not permit admission of ex parte
depositions: “The case of the King v. Paine is authority at least
for the general position that the ex parte examination of a
witness, although taken in the course of a judicial proceeding,
is not admissible in evidence, although the witness be dead,
and I have before remarked that the [Marian committal]
statute does not prescribe any new rule of evidence.”64 The
same court cited Paine in 1844 for the point that the Marian
statutes authorized admission “[p]rovided the accused was
present, and had the opportunity of a cross-examination, and
the witness be dead.”65
An 1842 New York case is especially instructive.66 The
witness there had been examined first by the committing
magistrate and then pursuant to a court order.67 The court
held the second examination inadmissible for lack of authority,
citing the Salkeld, Lord Raymond, and Comberbach reports of
Paine for the point that “there is no authority at the common
law [i.e., absent statute] for taking depositions out of court in
criminal cases.”68 The court then held the first examination
inadmissible because, even though the magistrate had
authority to examine under the state’s equivalent of the
Marian statutes, the witness had not been sworn for the crossThe court said:
“It is settled upon the
examination.69
construction of the statutes of Phil. & Mary, that the defendant
must be present at the examination of the witnesses against
him . . . . [T]he defendant shall have the opportunity to crossexamine, and if that right is not enjoyed, the deposition cannot
be read in evidence against him on the trial”—and as to that
point, the court cited the Modern and Comberbach versions of
Paine.70
Davies’ contrary authorities are not all supportive of his
position. For example, Hawkins (and the American manuals
that quoted him) wrote only that “it is said to have been
adjudged . . . , upon an Indictment for a Libel, that Depositions
64
65
66
67
68
69
70

State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 610 (App. L. 1835) (citation omitted).
State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 130 (App. L. 1844).
People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842).
Id. at 291-94.
Id. at 298.
Id. at 303-04.
Id. at 300.
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taken before a Justice of Peace relating to the Fact could not be
given in Evidence, tho’ the Deponent were dead; and that the
Reason why such Depositions may be given in Evidence in
Felony depends upon the [Marian statutes]. And that this
cannot be extended farther than the particular Case of
Felony.”71 This entails the same ambiguity as Paine itself. Is
the rule that “cannot be extended farther than the particular
Case of Felony” that examinations are admissible even if taken
ex parte, or merely that properly taken examinations are
admissible at all?72 Notably, when Thomas Leach revised
Hawkins’s treatise in 1795 to state that the Marian statutes
required an “opportunity of contradicting or cross-examining,”73
he made no change to this discussion of Paine.74 Davies relies
on that fact as if it somehow supported his position,75 but it
proves the opposite:
Leach evidently thought Hawkins’s
discussion was consistent with applying the cross-examination
rule to the Marian statutes.
Some English sources arguably support Davies’
interpretation. Gilbert, for example, wrote that Paine “would
not allow the Examinations . . . to be given in Evidence,
because Paine was not present to cross-examine, and tho’ tis
Evidence in Indictments for Felony in such case by Force [of
the Marian statutes] yet ’tis not so in Informations for
Misdemeanors”76—a description that, while ambiguous,77 is
71

2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 430. For the American manuals, see
Davies, supra note 5, at 183 n.246, 184 n.250, 184 n.253, and accompanying text.
72
Hawkins adds: “But in the Report of this Case in 5 Mod. it is said that the
Reason why such Depositions could not be read was, because the Defendant was not
present, when they were taken, and therefore had not the Benefit of a Cross
Examination.” 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 430 (footnote omitted). This
sentence could merely be making the point that, although some reports of Paine held
misdemeanor examinations never admissible, Modern relied only on the absence of
cross-examination and thus left open the possibility that a misdemeanor examination
might be admissible if an opportunity for cross-examination were provided.
73
4 HAWKINS (1795), supra note 11, at 423.
74
Id.
75
Davies, supra note 5, at 149.
76
GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 100 (Dublin 1754). The
passage was written before Gilbert’s death in 1726, three generations before the
framing; “it is generally agreed that Gilbert’s work reflects an understanding of
evidence formed no later than the opening decade of the eighteenth century.” Stephan
Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary Procedure in Eighteenth
Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 592 (1990). Nevertheless, the passage was
not substantively revised even as late as Lofft’s 1791 edition. See 1 GEOFFREY
GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 215 (Capel Lofft ed., London, Strahan & Woodfall
1791).
77
The passage could be saying either that (1) the examination was
inadmissible for two independent reasons: Paine was not present to cross-examine
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perhaps more naturally read as Davies suggests.
Two
eighteenth-century English cases also seem to interpret Paine
in that fashion.78
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Paine was widely
interpreted as not only consistent with a Marian crossexamination requirement, but as affirmatively supporting such
a requirement. Indeed, so far as I can tell, reported American
cases uniformly interpreted Paine that way. That those
sources were post-framing does not make them irrelevant.
Paine itself was available to the Framers, the decision is
ambiguous on its face, and the fact that it was widely
interpreted over the ensuing decades as establishing a crossexamination rule applicable even to Marian examinations is
relevant evidence of how the case was understood in 1789 or
1791. An interpretation cannot be dismissed as “fictional”
when that same interpretation was ultimately adopted as
settled law.
C.

Conclusion

Neither Hale’s rule that a Marian examination was
admissible if the witness was unavailable nor the decision in
King v. Paine shows that Marian examinations were
admissible even absent an opportunity to cross-examine.
Rather, Hale and his successors were widely read as simply not
addressing that issue, and Paine was widely read as taking the
exact opposite view.
II.

PRESENCE

I now turn to the affirmative case in support of the
cross-examination rule. There are two ways in which a
“and” the force of the Marian statutes authorizes admission of depositions at all only in
felony cases; or (2) the examination was inadmissible because Paine was not present to
cross-examine, and the force of the Marian statutes authorizes admission of ex parte
depositions only in felony cases. In other words, the “tis” could mean either ex parte
examinations or examinations generally, and “such case” could mean either ex parte
examinations or unavailable witnesses generally.
78
See King v. Westbeer, 1 Leach 12, 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108, 109 (1739) (citing
Salkeld as authority for admitting a Marian deposition over the objection that it would
deprive the prisoner of “the benefit which might otherwise have arisen from a crossexamination”), discussed infra text accompanying notes 158-62; King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R.
707, 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 823-24 (K.B. 1790) (Kenyon, C.J.), quoted and
discussed infra text accompanying notes 128-44. But see 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at
*488 n.(c), *491-92 (reading Kenyon’s citation to Paine in Eriswell as adopting the
interpretation suggested here), quoted infra note 136.
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prisoner could be denied the opportunity to cross-examine at a
committal hearing.
First, the magistrate could depose
witnesses in the prisoner’s absence—a prisoner who was not
present necessarily would have no opportunity to crossexamine. Second, the magistrate could depose witnesses in the
prisoner’s presence but refuse to permit any questions. This
section considers the former possibility. I first argue that, as a
factual matter, eighteenth-century Marian examinations were
routinely conducted in the prisoner’s presence. I then argue
that, by the framing, there was an emerging consensus that
presence was also a procedural right, so that depositions taken
in the prisoner’s absence could not be read against him at trial
under the authority of the Marian statutes.
A.

Presence as a Routine Feature of Marian Procedure

The Marian committal statute provided that a justice of
the peace “before whom any person shall be brought” must
“before . . . commit[ting] or send[ing] such Prisoner to Ward . . .
take the examination of such Prisoner, and information of
those that bring him.”79 The statute therefore contemplated
depositions in very particular circumstances. Witnesses who
believed someone had committed a felony would “br[ing]” him
before a justice of the peace. When the witnesses and prisoner
appeared before the justice, the prisoner would be in the
witnesses’ custody, and thus their presence. The statute
directed the justice to examine the prisoner and witnesses
“before” committing the prisoner to jail; there is no suggestion
that the prisoner be sequestered while witnesses are deposed.
A reasonable inference is that the prisoner would typically
remain in the custody (and therefore presence) of the witnesses
who brought him.
That inference follows not only from the statutory text,
but from the simple fact that Marian examinations are
committal examinations. The function of a committal hearing
is to decide whether to commit the prisoner, and a magistrate
cannot commit a prisoner who is not there. Committal
hearings are thus distinguishable from non-Marian pretrial
proceedings such as warrant applications, where there is no
particular reason to expect the prisoner’s presence. Chief
Justice Marshall made that distinction in 1807 during a
79
2 & 3 Phil. & M., c. 10 (1555). The language of the bail statute is similar.
1 & 2 Phil. & M., c. 13 (1554).
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colloquy in Ex parte Bollman: “If a person makes an affidavit
before a magistrate to obtain a warrant of arrest, such affidavit
must necessarily be ex parte. But how is it on a motion to
commit, after the person is taken? Must not the commitment
be upon testimony given in presence of the prisoner?”80
Marshall’s point here seems to be not so much that there is a
legal requirement that committal proceedings be conducted in
the prisoner’s presence, but that it would be strange to conduct
them any other way.81
Other evidence corroborates this theory. A 1747 print
by William Hogarth depicts a committal examination in the
Guildhall magistrates’ court; the accused is clearly shown to be
present while his accuser is sworn to testify against him.82
Other prints from the same era show “[p]eople waiting their
turn—prosecutors, accused, constables, the curious—simply
Committal examinations were often
st[anding] about.”83
conducted in the relatively informal setting of the justice’s
residence parlor,84 so it is not even clear where the prisoner
would have been kept if sequestered while the witnesses who
brought him were deposed.
The most compelling evidence of Marian procedure,
however, is in the depositions themselves. I obtained from the
80

Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 124 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.).
As Professor Davies notes, see Davies, supra note 10, at 631-32, the Court
in Bollman ultimately held that an ex parte affidavit was admissible at a committal
hearing, over counsel’s objection that “[t]he party arrested and brought before the
magistrate for commitment, has a right to be confronted with his accuser, and to crossexamine the witnesses produced against him.” 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 120, 129. But the
Attorney General in that case had conceded that such evidence would be inadmissible
at trial. See id. at 115 (“It is true that none of the evidence now offered would be
competent on the trial . . . .”). That the Court was willing to allow an affidavit at a
committal hearing does not prove the Court would treat it the same as a live Marian
examination if the witness became unavailable before trial. Marshall’s question
suggests that the committal procedure followed in Bollman was not typical.
82
WILLIAM HOGARTH, INDUSTRY AND IDLENESS NO. 10: THE INDUSTRIOUS
’PRENTICE ALDERMAN OF LONDON, THE IDLE ONE BROUGHT BEFORE HIM & IMPEACH’D
BY HIS ACCOMPLICE (1747), available at http://www.victorianweb.org/painting/
18c/hogarth/17.html (last visited Nov. 27, 2006); see also J.M. BEATTIE, POLICING AND
PUNISHMENT IN LONDON, 1660-1750, at 109 (2001) [hereinafter BEATTIE, POLICING AND
PUNISHMENT] (describing this picture); John H. Langbein, Shaping the EighteenthCentury Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder Sources, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 78-79
(1983) (reproducing the picture).
83
J.M. Beattie, Sir John Fielding and Public Justice: The Bow Street
Magistrates’ Court, 1754-1780, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (manuscript at
15) [hereinafter Beattie, Public Justice] (citing prints from 1742 and 1750).
84
See J.M. BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS IN ENGLAND, 1660-1800, at 27879 (1986) [hereinafter BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS]; BEATTIE, POLICING AND
PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 419; PETER KING, CRIME, JUSTICE, AND DISCRETION IN
ENGLAND, 1740-1820, at 85 (2000).
81

514

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:2

London Metropolitan Archives a sample of committal
depositions in twenty-seven cases from 1789.85 In twenty-two
of the cases—more than 80%—the prisoner is expressly
identified as being present in accusing witnesses’ testimony. In
one case, for example, the deposition states that the witness
“particularly remembers that on the night of the robbery and a
very short time before this Informant left his Shop the person
now present who calls himself Joseph Pocock came into his
Shop.”86 Another states that the witness “looked up and saw
the Prisoner Present who says his name is James Netherhood
take some Copper out of said Barge and give it to the other
prisoner present.”87
Twenty other cases contain similar
references.88 Two of those cases are particularly striking in
85
I located these materials by using the Old Bailey Proceedings Online
database. See The Proceedings of the Old Bailey, http://www.oldbaileyonline.org (last
visited Nov. 27, 2006). The depositions are not available online (unlike the trial
proceedings), but the creators of the site did add archive citations for depositions and
other “associated records” where those records survived. To construct my sample, I
searched for trials from 1789 with associated records likely to be committal depositions.
Because I constructed the sample from the trial proceedings, it necessarily excludes
cases where the prisoner was discharged before trial. I also excluded cases where the
associated records were located somewhere other than the London Metropolitan
Archives. Finally, because I was most interested in finding cases where the prisoner
might have been represented by counsel at the committal hearing (which seemed more
likely to yield evidence of cross-examination), I excluded cases where the prisoner
appeared pro se at trial. I located 13 cases with associated records coded as
“information” and “examination,” and 54 cases with associated records coded only as
“information.” I chose a sample consisting of all 13 cases in the former category and an
essentially random subset of 14 cases from the latter; I then obtained the records from
the London Metropolitan Archives. For purposes of whether the prisoner was present
at the committal hearing or not, I would expect this sample to be reasonably
representative.
86
Informations of George Bemfleet (Benfield) et al. against Joseph Pocock et
al., OBSP 1789 Feb/53-57, 87 (Jan. 31 & Feb. 3, 1789) (emphasis added) (also includes
three other similar references).
87
Information of Corbin Sangley against James Netherhood & Timothy
Hopkins, OBSP 1789 Sept/92 (Aug. 14, 1789) (emphasis added) (also includes one other
similar reference).
88
See Information of James Park against James Walton (Wharton), OBSP
1789 Jan/20 (Dec. 15, 1788) (“the person present who saith his name is James
Walton”); Examination of Robert Hutton against William Street & John Maidwell,
OBSP 1789 Jan/19, 30 (Jan. 3 & 5, 1789) (“the two men present who say their names
are William Street and John Maidwell”); Informations of William Morris et al. against
Jacob Canter, OBSP 1789 Feb/16-23, 84 (Jan. 7 & 26, 1789) (“a person now present
who calls himself Jacob Canter”; nine other similar references); Information of John
Grimes against Cuthbert Rutledge et al., OBSP 1789 Jan/18, 53 (Jan. 8, 1789) (“he saw
the persons present who say their names are Cuthbert Rutledge John Butler and John
Freeman”); Information of George Forester against Christopher Daly (Daley), OBSP
1789 Feb/41 (Feb. 14, 1789) (“he saw the person present who saith his name is
Christopher Daley”); Information of Chaffon Edgell against William Cook, OBSP 1789
Ap/69-70 (Mar. 25, 1789) (“the Person now present who calls himself William Cook”);
Information of John Clarke against Thomas Denton et al., OBSP 1789 Ap/10 (Mar. 27,
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that the prisoners were examined on one day and the witnesses
deposed on another, yet the witnesses still identified the
prisoners as present—evidently the prisoners were brought
back for those depositions.89 Of the remaining five cases, two
contain ambiguous indications that the prisoner was present,90
1789) (“two persons now present who call themselves Thomas Denton and John
Jones”); Information of Edward Smith against James Henley, OBSP 1789 Ap/73 (Apr.
3, 1789) (“he did suspect the man present who says his name is James Henley”);
Information of Joseph Barrett against Edward Lary, OBSP 1789 Ap/27 (Apr. 11, 1789)
(“a person now present who calls himself Edward Lary”); Information of Thomas
Lancaster against Edward Castledine, OBSP 1789 Ap/47, 76 (Apr. 22, 1789) (“[t]he
person present who says his name is Edward Castledine”); Information of Thomas
Beszant against David Coleman, OBSP 1789 Ju/35 (May 6, 1789) (“said Draft was
presented for payment by a person now present who calls himself David Coleman”; one
other similar reference); Information of James McManus against John Bannister,
OBSP 1789 Ju/47 (May 7, 1789) (“he apprehended John Bannister the prisoner now
present”); Information of Robert Tate against Edward Tapp, OBSP 1789 Ju/38 (May 9,
1789) (“a person now present who calls himself Edward Tapp”); Information of Simon
Wood against Joseph Lucas & James Rock, OBSP 1789 Jy/22 (June 26, 1789) (“saw the
persons present who say their names are Joseph Lucas and James Rock”); Information
of David Mackintosh against Francis Burrows, OBSP 1789 Sept/87 (Aug. 16, 1789)
(“one of the men now present that calls himself Francis Burrows”); Information of John
Fletcher against George Dawson & Deborah Dawson, OBSP 1789 Sept/90a-b (Aug. 18,
1789) (“he met the person now present who calls herself Deborah Dawson”);
Informations of John Roberts & John Clark against Thomas Girling, OBSP 1789
Sept/81a-c, 82 (Aug. 18 & Sept. 11, 1789) (“Thomas Girling the Letter Carrier now
present”; one other similar reference); Information of Mary Tollin against Edward
Studsbury & Charles Burton, OBSP 1789 Sept/74 (Sept. 1, 1789) (“the person now
present, who calls himself Edward Studsbury”; “the other person also now present, who
calls himself Charles Burton”); Information of Catherine Baker against William
Cunningham, OBSP 1789 Oct/59 (Oct. 10, 1789) (“has no doubt but that the person
now present who calls himself William Cunningham is the man she saw lying down in
the Passage as aforesaid”); Information of Mary Smith against Joseph Webb, OBSP
1789 Oct/73 (Oct. 14, 1789) (“the prisoner now present, who calls himself Joseph
Webb”). Qualifications should be noted with respect to two of these cases. First, in the
Thomas Girling case, although multiple witnesses identified the prisoner as present,
the archive file includes a second set of depositions taken about a month later that
refer to the prisoner as being then in custody at Newgate. See Informations of John
Roberts et al. against Thomas Girling, OBSP 1789 Sept/81a-c, 82 (Aug. 18 & Sept. 11,
1789). Apparently the prisoner was committed upon the first set of depositions; it is
unclear whether this second set (seemingly ex parte) were Marian committal
depositions or not. Second, in the Street and Maidwell case, although one person
clearly identified both prisoners as present, another stated that “neither of the persons
are present who was present at the loading of the said last mentioned Waggon”; it is
unclear from context whether the persons referred to include either of the prisoners.
Information of Robert Bygrave against William Street & John Maidwell, OBSP 1789
Jan/30 (Jan. 5, 1789).
89
See Examination of Robert Hutton against William Street & John
Maidwell, OBSP 1789 Jan/19, 30 (Jan. 3 & 5, 1789); Informations of William Morris et
al. against Jacob Canter, OBSP 1789 Feb/16-23, 84 (Jan. 7 & 26, 1789).
90
In one case, the deposition refers to the prisoner as “William Ward now
under Examination.” Information of John Peacock against William Ward, OBSP 1789
Ju/17 (May 6, 1789). In the other, the deposition states that the witness “met the
Prisoner who says her name is Eleanor Hays”; the prisoner’s own examination appears
on the same document immediately after the witness’s deposition; and the prisoner
begins by exclaiming that the witness has “Perjured himself,” suggesting she was
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and three contain no indication either way.91 Overall, this
evidence suggests that presence was not merely a routine
feature of Marian procedure, but a near-universal one.
The notion that Marian examinations were conducted in
the prisoner’s absence seems to have originated in a late
nineteenth-century treatise by English historian James
Stephen. In contrasting the Marian statutes with the 1848
legislation explicitly requiring opportunity for crossexamination, Stephen wrote that under the former “[t]he
prisoner had no right to be, and probably never was, present.”92
He cited no source for that claim, however; it was not carefully
researched the way much of Stephen’s work was. We can only
speculate about his rationale. If Stephen was inferring that
the prisoner probably never was present merely because he had
no express statutory right to be present, his conclusion is a non
sequitur. Whatever the rationale, Stephen’s claim seems
impossible to reconcile with the evidence above, which shows
that the prisoner was almost invariably present when his
accusers testified against him at a committal hearing.93
B.

Presence as a Procedural Right

Was presence more than a natural feature of Marian
practice—was it also a procedural right? The general rule that
evidence must be given in the presence of the accused was
settled long before the framing. Hawkins, for example, had
written that it was “a settled Rule, That in Cases of Life no
Evidence is to be given against a Prisoner but in his
Presence.”94 The exchange in Fenwick’s case suggested that
present for his testimony. Information of Fredreck Seabeck against Eleanor Hays,
OBSP 1789 Dec/54 (Nov. 28, 1789).
91
Informations of Joseph Athinson et al. against William Patmore, OBSP
1789 Feb/72a-b (Jan. 20 & 31, 1789); Informations of James Kerton et al. against
Francis Fleming et al., OBSP 1789 Feb/60, 86 (Jan. 28, 1789); Informations of Nunn
Ilston & Edward Vaughan Williams against Thomas Taylor, OBSP 1789 Dec/79 (Dec.
9, 1789).
92
1 JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF
ENGLAND 221 (London, MacMillan 1883).
93
Beattie writes in his Crime and the Courts in England that “[t]he Marian
legislation gave the prisoner few rights at this stage of the investigation. He was not to
be told precisely what the evidence was against him, nor to be present when the
deposition of his accuser was taken.” BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84,
at 271. I am informed by the author, however, that the intent of this passage was
merely to convey that the prisoner had no right to be present, and that normally he
would have been present nonetheless. E-mail from John Beattie to Robert Kry (Apr.
22, 2006) (on file with author).
94
2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 428 (footnote omitted).
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this general rule might also apply in the specific context of
And the pervasive references to
Marian examinations.95
“presence” in the Marian depositions themselves raise a strong
suspicion that presence was more than just a natural feature of
Marian procedure.96 The strongest evidence, however, comes
from three cases decided almost contemporaneously with the
adoption of the Bill of Rights: King v. Radbourne,97 King v.
Woodcock,98 and King v. Dingler.99
Radbourne was a murder and petty treason trial of a
maid accused of killing her mistress. William Garrow, the
most celebrated criminal defense lawyer of his day,100
represented the prosecution. The victim had been examined
before she died by a justice of the peace; the case report
specifically mentions that the examination was taken “in the
presence of the prisoner,” “heard by the prisoner,” and
“distinctly read over to her in the presence of ” the victim.101
Garrow argued that the deposition was admissible under the
Marian statutes:
Garrow, for the Crown, . . . contended that Mrs. Morgan’s deposition
was admissible in evidence . . . as an information taken by a regular
magistrate, under the statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been
given in the presence and hearing of the prisoner, upon an oath
lawfully administered to Mrs. Morgan, who had thereby called God
to witness that what she said was true, and who had in the presence
of the prisoner, made an additional attestation of its truth, by
putting her signature thereto . . . .102

The deposition was admitted, and the defendant convicted of
murder.103
95

See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
97
1 Leach 457, 168 Eng. Rep. 330 (1787) (reported 1789/1800).
98
1 Leach 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352 (1789) (reported 1789).
99
2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791) (reported 1800). The quotations
that follow in the text are taken from the 1815 fourth edition of Leach’s Crown Cases
that appears in the English Reports. I note below instances in which Leach’s fourth
edition differs materially from his earlier editions. I am indebted to Professor Davies
for drawing my attention to those differences. In an attempt to verify the accuracy of
Leach’s reporting, I also compared his reports to the earlier accounts in the Old Bailey
Sessions Papers. Although the reports are similar in many respects, there are material
discrepancies, which I likewise note below.
100
See infra note 178.
101
Radbourne, 1 Leach at 459, 168 Eng. Rep. at 331-32.
102
Id. at 460-61, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (emphasis added).
103
Id. at 461-62, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332-33. The decision was referred to the
Twelve Judges—essentially, England’s en banc process for criminal cases—and
affirmed. Id. at 462, 168 Eng. Rep. at 333. The version of Radbourne in the English
96
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In Woodcock, the prisoner was charged with murdering
his wife. The victim was found injured in a ditch and taken to
a poor-house, where a magistrate examined her before she
died. The court refused to admit the examination under the
Marian statutes:
[A Marian] deposition, if the deponent should die between the time
of examination and the trial of the prisoner, may be substituted in
the room of that viva voce testimony which the deponent, if living,
could alone have given, and is admitted of necessity as evidence of
the fact. In the present case a doubt has arisen with the Court, to
which doubt I entirely subscribe, Whether the examination of the
deceased, taken in writing at the poor-house by Mr. Read, the
Magistrate, is an examination of the nature I have last described? It
was not taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was
brought before him in custody; the prisoner therefore had no
opportunity of contradicting the facts it contains. It was not in the
discharge of that part of Mr. Read’s duty by which he is, on hearing
the witnesses, to bail or commit the prisoner; but it was a voluntary
and extrajudicial act, performed at the request of the Overseer; and
although it was a very proper and prudent act, yet being voluntary,
and under circumstances where the Justice was not authorized to
administer an oath, it cannot be admitted before a Jury as evidence;
for no evidence can be legal unless it be given upon oath, judicially
taken.104

Reports is substantially the same as the version in Leach’s 1800 third edition. See 2
THOMAS LEACH, CASES IN CROWN LAW 512-20 (London 3d ed. 1800). The version in
Leach’s 1789 first edition is shorter; it states that the victim “gave an information upon
oath, before a Justice of the Peace, which was read deliberately over to her in the
presence and hearing of the prisoner,” but does not include arguments of counsel and
therefore omits Garrow’s express tying of presence to admissibility under the Marian
statutes. See THOMAS LEACH, CASES IN CROWN LAW 399-401 (London 1st ed. 1789).
Leach’s 1792 second edition italicizes the words “to her in the presence and hearing of
the prisoner,” but otherwise is similar to the first edition. See THOMAS LEACH, CASES
IN CROWN LAW 363-64 (London 2d ed. 1792). In the version in the Old Bailey Sessions
Papers, Garrow argues that the information is admissible because it was “given in the
presence of the prisoner,” but he makes that point as a general principle of evidence
law without specific reference to the Marian statutes:
[O]ne of the grounds of receiving such declarations, when made in the
presence and hearing of the prisoner, is this; that when an innocent man is
accused in a solemn manner, his innocent mind instantly revolts at the
accusation; and he asserts his innocence, and denies his guilt; and therefore if
he does not do so, when he hears the accusation, that is evidence at least to
go to a Jury, that he did not object to it when he heard it.
Trial of Henrietta Radbourne, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, July 11, 1787, at 750, 752.
104
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789)
(citation omitted; emphasis added).
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The court nevertheless told the jury it could consider the
testimony as a dying declaration if given under apprehension of
death; the jury convicted.105
Dingler was another case in which the prisoner was
accused of murdering his wife. Abingdon, the magistrate, had
examined the victim at the infirmary before she died, after the
husband was in custody but outside his presence.
The
defendant was represented at trial by William Garrow, the
same lawyer who had represented the Crown in Radbourne
four years earlier. Garrow argued that the examination was
inadmissible:
[The Marian committal statute] enacts, “That such Justice or
Justices, before whom any person shall be brought for manslaughter
or felony, or for suspicion thereof, before he or they shall commit or
send such prisoner to ward, shall take the examination of such
prisoner, and information of those that bring him, of the fact and
circumstances thereof, and the same, or so much thereof as shall be
material to prove the felony, shall put in writing,” &c. The
Magistrate, therefore, is only authorized to take an examination of
the person brought before him, and of those who bring him: this is
the course which the law has prescribed to the Magistrate on these
occasions; and when this course is pursued, the prisoner may have, as
he is entitled to have, the benefit of cross-examination; but in the
course which has been pursued by Mr. Abingdon, as the prisoner was
not present, no judicial examination has been taken, as he could not
have the benefit of cross-examination. . . . The authority of the
Magistrate in such cases grows out of the statute; it is
commensurate with the terms of it; and therefore it is utterly
impossible, unless the prisoner had been present, that depositions
thus taken can be read; and he cited the case of Rex v. Woodcock.106

The court sustained the objection “on the authority of the case
cited.”107
105
Id. at 504, 168 Eng. Rep. at 354. The version of Woodcock in the English
Reports is the same in relevant respects as the versions in all of Leach’s prior editions.
See 2 LEACH (1800), supra note 103, at 563-68; LEACH (1792), supra note 103, at 397401; LEACH (1789), supra note 103, at 437-42. The version in the Old Bailey Sessions
Papers differs somewhat; among other things, where Leach reports the judge as stating
that the deposition “was not taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner
was brought before him in custody; the prisoner therefore had no opportunity of
contradicting the facts it contains,” the Old Bailey Sessions Papers reports him as
stating more ambiguously that Marian examinations are “taken where persons are in
custody, and when the justice hears the examination of witnesses against persons in
custody.” Trial of William Woodcock, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Jan. 14, 1789, at 95,
111.
106
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791)
(citation omitted; emphasis added).
107
Id. at 563, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384. The version of Dingler in the English
Reports is substantially the same as the version in Leach’s 1800 third edition. See 2
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Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler confirm that, by the
framing era, Marian examinations were normally conducted in
the prisoner’s presence. The deposition in Radbourne was
taken “in the presence of the prisoner.”108 Although Davies
thinks that merely reflects the fact that the petty treason
charge independently entitled the prisoner to be present,109
Garrow expressly argued that presence was relevant under the
Marian statutes—the deposition was properly taken “under the
statutes of Philip & Mary; for it had been given in the presence
and hearing of the prisoner.”110 Likewise, in Woodcock, the
court distinguished the deposition at hand from one taken “as
the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was brought
before [the magistrate] in custody,” affording an “opportunity of
contradicting the facts it contains.”111 And in Dingler, Garrow
distinguished the deposition at issue from a committal
examination on the ground that it was not taken in the
prisoner’s presence.112 All three cases thus confirm that Marian
examinations were normally conducted in the prisoner’s
presence.
The three cases do more than reveal how Marian
examinations were normally conducted—they also speak to
admissibility. In Radbourne, the deposition was “admissible in
LEACH (1800), supra note 103, at 638-41. Professor Davies supposes that Dingler first
appeared in Leach’s 1792 second edition, see Davies, supra note 5, at 157 n.164, but
that edition in fact only reports cases through the July Session of 1791 and therefore
does not include Dingler’s September trial, although the case is mentioned in a
marginal note to Woodcock. See LEACH (1792), supra note 103, at 401 n.(a). In the Old
Bailey Sessions Papers, Garrow’s argument is more discursive, but he makes similar
points. See Trial of George Dingler, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 14, 1791, at 468,
473-77. That report is discussed infra notes 166-76 and accompanying text.
108
King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331 (1787).
Professor Davies observes that Leach’s first edition reported that the deposition was
“read” rather than “taken” in the prisoner’s presence. See Davies, supra note 10, at
607-09. But the report states that the deposition was “read deliberately over to her”—
i.e., the witness—“in the presence and hearing of the prisoner.” LEACH (1789), supra
note 103, at 400 (emphasis added). In other words, the witness and the prisoner were
both present when the prisoner was apprised of the witness’s testimony. That
arrangement is no more or less conducive to cross-examination than taking the
deposition in the prisoner’s presence in the first instance; in either case the prisoner
can question the witness about her testimony unless the magistrate affirmatively
prevents her from doing so.
109
Davies, supra note 5, at 165.
110
Radbourne, 1 Leach at 461, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (emphasis added). As
noted supra note 103, this quotation appears in Leach’s 1800 third edition but not in
his prior editions. Nevertheless, Leach’s third edition, together with the Old Bailey
Sessions Papers report, see supra note 103, strongly suggest that Garrow argued
presence was relevant for reasons unrelated to the treason statute.
111
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789).
112
Dingler, 2 Leach at 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384.
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evidence . . . for it had been given in the presence and hearing
of the prisoner.”113 In Woodcock, the deposition was not
admissible under the Marian statutes because the prisoner was
not “brought before [the magistrate] in custody.”114 And in
Dingler, Garrow argued that it was “utterly impossible, unless
the prisoner had been present, that depositions thus taken can
be read.”115 Presence was thus not only a natural consequence
of Marian procedure, but a procedural right—unless the
prisoner was present, the deposition could not be read at trial.
Later sources confirm that interpretation, routinely citing
these cases as holding that depositions taken in the prisoner’s
absence were inadmissible.116
Davies makes much of a distinction between what he
terms the “strong” and “nuanced” versions of Justice Scalia’s
claim that these cases “rejected” the “statutory derogation
view.”117 As he notes, Woodcock and Dingler did not hold that
depositions taken in conformity with the Marian statutes were
inadmissible if taken ex parte; rather, they held that the
depositions at issue were not taken in conformity with the
Marian statutes.118 But that distinction is academic because
the reason the depositions were held not to have conformed to
the Marian statutes was that they were taken ex parte. There
is no practical difference between excluding Marian depositions
taken ex parte and holding that depositions taken ex parte are
not Marian depositions and for that reason inadmissible. In
either case, presence is a condition of admissibility.
Davies also objects to the timing of the decisions:
Leach’s reports of Radbourne and Woodcock were not published
until 1789, at most a few months before Congress proposed the
113

Radbourne, 1 Leach at 460-61, 168 Eng. Rep. at 332 (emphasis added).
Woodcock, 1 Leach at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353. The deposition was
excluded because it was taken “under circumstances where the Justice was not
authorized to administer an oath.” Id. One of those “circumstances,” however, was
that the prisoner was not “brought before [the magistrate] in custody.” Id.
115
Dingler, 2 Leach at 563, 168 Eng. Rep. at 384.
116
See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (citing Woodcock
and Dingler); Rex v. Smith, Holt 614, 614-16, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 357-60 (1817)
(apparently citing Radbourne); ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85 (citing Radbourne); 1
CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79 & n.(l) (citing Woodcock and Dingler); 4 HAWKINS (1795),
supra note 11, at 423 (citing Woodcock and Dingler); PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, at
40-41 (citing Radbourne and Dingler); PHILLIPPS, supra note 11, at 277 & n.3 (citing
Woodcock); 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487-89 (citing Woodcock and Dingler).
117
Davies, supra note 5, at 162-64; see Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,
54 n.5 (2004) (“[T]o the extent [ex parte] Marian examinations were admissible, it was
only because the statutes derogated from the common law.”).
118
See Davies, supra note 5, at 166-69.
114
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Sixth Amendment for ratification; his report of Dingler was not
published until after the Sixth Amendment was ratified.
Davies argues that these decisions are not valid evidence of
original meaning because the reports would not have been
widely available in the United States when the Sixth
Amendment was framed.119
That argument assumes, incorrectly, that English
evidence is relevant only if published in a treatise or case
report shipped to America before the framing. That is too
narrow a view of the sources of information on which American
legal thinkers relied. Many colonial lawyers, for example,
trained in London and thus were directly exposed to English
practices and ideas. One historian writes that “[a] far greater
number [of colonial lawyers] than is generally known, received
their legal education in London in the Inns of Court; and the
influence, on the American Bar, of these English-bred lawyers,
especially in the more southerly Colonies, was most potent.”120
Another historian counts more than 115 American lawyers who
trained between 1760 and 1775 in London, where they could
“come into personal contact with some of England’s leading
lawyers and judges.”121 He finds that “[t]he professional
influence which these English-trained lawyers had on the
colonial bar is beyond imagination.”122 At least nine of the
thirty-one lawyers at the Constitutional Convention trained in
England.123 Because colonial lawyers were directly exposed to
English practices and ideas, English evidence is relevant
whether or not it appeared in a published treatise or case
report shipped to the colonies.
Furthermore, the way Marian examinations were
conducted in England in 1787, 1789, or 1791 is relevant to how
they were conducted during the preceding decades.
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler do not purport to change
Marian committal procedure in any way; they simply confirm
what that procedure already was. None of the cases excluded a
119
Id. at 153-62. I take no position on whether 1789 or 1791 is the more
relevant date for assessing original meaning because I do not view that two-year
difference as having much practical significance.
120
CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188 (1911).
121
1 ANTON-HERMANN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN
AMERICA 33 (1965).
122
Id. at 36.
123
See BERGER, supra note 36, at 87 n.160 (noting that four had studied in the
Inner Temple and five in the Middle Temple); WARREN, supra note 120, at 211 (“four
had studied in the Inner Temple, and one at Oxford, under Blackstone”).
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committal deposition taken ex parte—Radbourne admitted a
properly taken deposition, and Woodcock and Dingler rejected
attempts to use the Marian statutes to admit non-committal
depositions. The cases suggest that magistrates in the late
eighteenth century were becoming more assertive in
investigating crime by taking voluntary depositions unrelated
to their statutory committal function,124 and that courts were
unwilling to expand the statutes to reach those depositions.
But they do not suggest any novelty in how committal
examinations were conducted.
Radbourne, Woodcock, and Dingler are also evidence of
the conditions of admissibility that were understood to exist
during the preceding decades. They are relevant, not as a
source of new legal rights, but as a reflection of existing
understandings of legal rights. Significantly, the rule they
acknowledged was not invented from scratch, but was a
straightforward reading of the statutory text: The statutes
authorized a justice of the peace to examine only a suspect and
the witnesses who brought him; the prisoner in such a case
would necessarily be present; and an examination not taken
“as the statute directs” was not admissible under its
authority.125 Several other English authorities followed that
same line of textual reasoning.126 And the way English
authorities interpreted statutory text is a reasonable proxy for
how Americans would have interpreted similar text in their
own committal statutes. As indeed they did: When the North
124

This is consistent with other evidence that magistrates were taking a more
aggressive role in investigating and prosecuting crime during this era. See, e.g.,
Beattie, Public Justice, supra note 83, at 9 (describing the “Bow Street runners,” the
“first quasi-official detective policemen” directed by magistrates in the mid-eighteenth
century); id. at 23-35 (describing the “re-examination” procedure first used by Bow
Street magistrates in the mid-eighteenth century).
125
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); see also
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562-63, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791).
126
See King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 n.(c)
(K.B. 1790) (reporter’s note 1797) (“Nor [are committal examinations admissible] since
that statute, unless the party accused be present, . . . see the words of the [Marian
statutes].”); Rex v. Forbes, Holt 599 n.*, 599 n.*, 171 Eng. Rep. 354 n.*, 354 n.* (1814)
(“[T]he intention of the statute of Philip and Mary is sufficiently plain. It is, that the
prisoner shall be present whilst the witness actually delivers his testimony . . . .”); 2
STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487-88 (“[W]here the informations are taken before a
magistrate, the words of the statute strongly imply that the prisoner is supposed to be
present, for the Justice is to take the examination of the prisoner, and the informations
of those who bring the prisoner; and if they were to be taken in the prisoner’s absence
he would lose the benefit of cross-examination . . . .”). But see Rex v. Smith, Holt 614,
615, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360 (1817) (“[T]he statute did not mention the prisoner’s
presence at all. Undoubtedly, however, the decisions established the point, that the
prisoner ought to be present, that he might cross-examine.”).
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Carolina court held in Webb in 1794 that “our [committal
statute] clearly implies the depositions to be read, must be
taken in [the prisoner’s] presence,”127 it was drawing the same
textual inference that Woodcock and Dingler had drawn just a
few years earlier.
Nevertheless, the rule articulated by Radbourne,
Woodcock, and Dingler was not universally accepted. In the
1790 case of King v. Eriswell, the King’s Bench divided over
whether the ex parte examination of a pauper who had become
insane could be admitted in a suit to charge a town with his
care.128 In defending admissibility, Justice Buller relied by
analogy on his construction of the Marian statutes: “Where an
act is judicially done, it is not necessary that the person to be
affected by it should be present in order to make it evidence
against him, and therefore depositions taken by a justice of a
person who afterwards died, though taken in the absence of the
prisoner, must be read. So it was determined by all the Judges
in Radburn’s case.”129 Two other judges, Grose and Kenyon,
disagreed with Buller as to pauper examinations but did not
dispute his premise that ex parte Marian depositions were
admissible, instead dismissing it as a statutory exception to the
common-law rule. Grose wrote:
Evidence, though upon oath, to affect an absent person, is
incompetent, because he cannot cross examine; as nothing can be
more unjust than that a person should be bound by evidence which
he is not permitted to hear. Before the Statute of Philip & Mary, a
deposition taken before the justice of the county where the murder
was committed was not evidence, even though the party died or was
unable to travel.
Why?
Because although the justice had
jurisdiction to enquire into the fact, the common law did not permit a
person accused to be affected by an examination taken in his
absence, because he could not cross examine; and therefore that
statute was made.130

Chief Justice Kenyon added:
Examinations upon oath, except in the excepted cases, are of no avail
unless they are made in a cause or proceeding depending between
the parties to be affected by them, and where each has an
opportunity of cross-examining the witness . . . . It has been said that
there are cases where examinations are admitted, namely, before the
coroner, and before magistrates in cases of felony. . . . Those
127
128
129
130

State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Super. L. 1794).
King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 100 Eng. Rep. 815 (K.B. 1790) (reported 1790).
Id. at 713-14, 100 Eng. Rep. at 819 (Buller, J.) (citation omitted).
Id. at 710, 100 Eng. Rep. at 817 (Grose, J.) (reporter’s notes omitted).
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exceptions alluded to are founded on the Statutes of Philip & Mary;
and that they go no further is abundantly proved. . . . [W]ithout
stating the cases which occur on this head, I will do little more than
refer to the case of The King v. Paine. That was not loosely decided,
but was the opinion of this Court assisted by the Court of Common
Pleas. In Salkeld it is expressly said that the rule cannot be
extended further than the particular case of felony; and in the other
book the Chief Justice declared that the depositions were not
evidence; and a weighty reason is given, namely, “The defendant not
being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had
lost the benefit of a cross-examination.”131

The fourth judge, Ashhurst, thought Buller’s position on
pauper examinations compelled by precedent, though “[i]f this
were a new case, I should be strongly of opinion that the
evidence given ought not to have been received, as being
hearsay evidence.”132 He stated no view on ex parte Marian
depositions, but since he was on the court that decided
Woodcock a year earlier,133 it is doubtful he agreed with Buller
on that specific point.134
Eriswell admittedly provides evidence that the
admissibility of ex parte Marian depositions was still disputed
at the time of the framing. Buller specifically states that
Marian depositions were admissible even if “taken in the
absence of the prisoner,”135 and Grose and Kenyon never clearly
dispute that premise.136 While Buller says nothing about
whether committal depositions were normally taken in the

131
Id. at 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. at 823-24 (Kenyon, C.J.) (citation, reporter’s
note omitted).
132
Id. at 720, 100 Eng. Rep. at 822 (Ashhurst, J.).
133
See King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 500, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 352 (1789)
(identifying Ashhurst as “present”). The presiding judge’s statement that “a doubt has
arisen with the Court, to which doubt I entirely subscribe,” seems to indicate that the
other judges present shared his concerns. See id. at 502, 168 Eng. Rep. at 353.
134
In 1801, the year after Buller died, ex parte pauper examinations were
ruled inadmissible. See King v. Ferry Frystone, 2 East 54, 102 Eng. Rep. 289 (K.B.
1801).
135
Eriswell, 3 T.R. at 713-14, 100 Eng. Rep. at 819 (Buller, J.).
136
Starkie, however, did interpret Kenyon’s reference to Paine as disputing
Buller’s premise. See 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *488 n.(c) (“It seems to have been
the opinion of Ld. Kenyon . . . that depositions so taken [ex parte] were not admissible;
and he refers to Payne’s case (as reported 5 Mod. 163), and terms the objection there
taken to admitting the deposition in evidence, namely, the loss of cross-examination, a
weighty objection.”); id. at *491-92 (“[H]e immediately afterwards laid great stress upon
the case of The King v. Paine . . . . It cannot therefore be inferred that Lord Kenyon
fully acceded to the admissibility of such evidence, although in the course of his
argument, assuming them to be exceptions, he denied the consequences attempted to
be deduced from them.”).
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prisoner’s absence, he at least contemplates the possibility that
they might be taken that way.137
It is remarkable, however, that the only authority
Buller relies on—Radbourne—squarely refutes his position.
The deposition there was “given in the presence and hearing of
the prisoner,” and the prosecution counsel expressly stated that
the Marian statutes required as much.138 That discrepancy was
not lost on commentators. When Thomas Peake reprinted
Eriswell in 1801, he inserted a footnote in Buller’s opinion
recounting that Leach’s report of Radbourne “expressly stated
that the deposition was taken in the presence of the prisoner”;
that Peake had reviewed the magistrate’s statement in the
sessions papers and found it “agreeable to this report”; and
that he had reviewed a manuscript copy of the case and found
that it did not “appear that the point, whether a deposition
taken in the absence of the prisoner was evidence or not, was
at all submitted to the consideration of the judges.”139 Leonard
MacNally wrote in 1802 that Leach’s account “varies
materially” from Buller’s; that in the former the deposition was
“deliberately read over to [the witness] in the presence and
hearing of the prisoner”; and that “[t]he words in italics are
omitted by the learned judge.”140 Thomas Starkie wrote in 1824
that “[Buller] refers to Radbourne’s case . . . ; but in that case
the deposition was taken in the hearing of the prisoner, and of
course the question did not arise”;141 he described Kenyon as

137
Three years after Eriswell, a court in a (noncriminal) paternity case also
cited the Marian statutes in passing for the point that an “examination . . . taken
before a magistrate in the course of a judicial proceeding . . . is certainly admissible
evidence,” even though the putative father there had argued that the paternity
examination was “not taken in the presence of the party to be affected by it.” King v.
Ravenstone, 5 T.R. 373, 374, 101 Eng. Rep. 209, 209 (K.B. 1793). For contrary
American authority, see Dunwiddie v. Commonwealth, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 290, 290 (1808).
138
King v. Radbourne, 1 Leach 457, 459-61, 168 Eng. Rep. 330, 331-32 (1787).
As noted supra note 103, all the reports of Radbourne are clear that the deposition was
taken in the prisoner’s presence (or at least read back to the witness in the prisoner’s
presence), although only some include counsel’s argument making presence a condition
of admissibility. Leach in his 1792 second edition italicized the words “to her in the
presence and hearing of the prisoner” that had appeared in his 1789 first edition before
Eriswell was decided, see LEACH (1792), supra note 103, at 363; that revision was
evidently a direct response to Buller’s argument.
139
PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, app. 1, at 144 n.*. The last reference is
apparently to the statement of the case by the presiding judge on submission to the
Twelve Judges. See supra note 103.
140
MACNALLY, supra note 11, at 307 n.*.
141
2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *488 n.(c) (citation omitted); see also id. at
*491 (“It is however remarkable, that in Radbourn’s case the information was taken in
the presence of the prisoner.” (footnote omitted)).
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merely having assumed the admissibility of such evidence for
the sake of argument.142 Most striking is a footnote that the
case reporters, Durnford and East, inserted in their 1797
edition. Where Grose had written “Before the statute of Philip
& Mary, a deposition taken before the justice of the county
where the murder was committed was not evidence, even
though the party died or was unable to travel,” they added:
“Nor since that statute, unless the party accused be
present . . . ; see the words of the [Marian statutes].”143
This highly negative reception suggests that, even
around the time Eriswell was decided, the prevailing view in
the legal community was that Buller’s dictum had misstated
the law. As a judge, Buller was respected for his legal abilities
but was fairly reactionary on criminal procedure matters.144
Eriswell may well be an instance of that.
C.

Conclusion

Marian depositions were routinely conducted in the
prisoner’s presence, a natural consequence of the statutory text
and the function of a committal hearing. At some point before
the framing, that practice hardened into a procedural right.
The timing is difficult to pinpoint because, so long as Marian
depositions were conducted the way they were normally
conducted, the question did not arise. The catalysts for the
principle’s express recognition in reported cases were not ex
parte committal hearings, but attempts to stretch the statutes
to non-committal contexts where presence was not routine.
Courts then had to decide what features of committal
examinations rendered their admission acceptable. One such

142

See supra note 136.
3 CHARLES DURNFORD & EDWARD HYDE EAST, TERM REPORTS IN THE
COURT OF KING’S BENCH 710 n.(c) (London, Strahan new ed. 1797). The note does not
appear in Durnford and East’s original 1790 report, see 3 CHARLES DURNFORD &
EDWARD HYDE EAST, REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF
KING’S BENCH 710 (London, Strahan & Woodfall 1790), or in Peake’s 1801 reprint, see
PEAKE (1801), supra note 11, app. 1, at 140-41, but it appears in later editions of the
Term Reports, including the 1817 edition in the English Reports, see King v. Eriswell, 3
T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 817 n.(c) (K.B. 1790).
144
See, e.g., JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL
212-16 (2003) (describing Buller’s role in dismantling the accomplice-corroboration
rule). I leave to the reader the relevance of Buller’s ascribed views on family discipline.
See JAMES GILLRAY, JUDGE THUMB, OR—PATENT STICKS FOR FAMILY CORRECTION:
WARRANTED LAWFUL! (1782), available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Image:Judge_
Thumb.jpg (last visited Nov. 27, 2006).
143
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feature, they determined, was the prisoner’s presence; and thus
a confrontation right was read into the Marian statutes.
III.

CROSS-EXAMINATION

Crawford did not require mere presence as a condition
of admissibility, but also opportunity for cross-examination.
This section examines that further requirement.
A.

Background

While the statutory text invites the inference that
prisoners were routinely present for committal depositions, it
contains no express indication whether cross-examination was
contemplated. That does not mean, however, that one should
assume no opportunity for cross-examination existed.
The admissibility of a Marian deposition has only ever
depended on whether the prisoner had an opportunity for crossexamination—not on whether cross-examination actually
occurred.145 The mere fact that cross-examination was unusual,
therefore, would not disprove the cross-examination rule; all
that matters is the opportunity.
Furthermore, crossexamination need not have been affirmatively invited by the
magistrate (although that was apparently done by the early
nineteenth century).146 So long as the prisoner was present,
opportunity for cross-examination would require only that the
magistrate not interfere if the prisoner sought to ask questions.
Viewed in that light, statutory silence should not be taken to
indicate that no opportunity for cross-examination existed.
The statutes did not mention cross-examination, but nor did
they affirmatively direct the magistrate to prohibit it.
If cross-examination never took place, one could argue
that the opportunity was so theoretical that the Framers would
not have attached any significance to it. It therefore makes
sense to inquire whether cross-examination at committal
hearings likely ever occurred. Two considerations suggest it
was probably very rare before the second half of the eighteenth
century, although developments over that period may have
made it less anomalous.
145

See, e.g., various sources cited supra notes 11-13.
In Smith, the prisoner was expressly offered the opportunity to crossexamine. See Rex v. Smith, Holt 614, 614, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 357 (1817) (“The
prisoner was asked whether he would chuse to put any questions to him, but declined
to do so.”).
146
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The first concerns the prisoner’s incentive to crossexamine. The Marian statutes did not give justices of the peace
any express authority to discharge prisoners; their only options
were to commit for trial or release on bail, according to the
seriousness of the offense charged.147 Because the statutes did
not contemplate discharge, the prisoner had little incentive to
challenge adverse testimony at the committal hearing. As legal
historians have documented, however, during the eighteenth
century magistrates began exercising an extra-statutory power
of discharge, releasing a felony suspect if the evidence was
insufficient.148 As a result, the prisoner had a much greater
incentive to test the sufficiency of the prosecutor’s case.
The second development concerns the involvement of
lawyers. At the start of the eighteenth century, counsel could
appear for a criminal defendant at trial only in cases of treason
or misdemeanor, not felony.149 The rule against felony counsel
receded during the eighteenth century, starting in the 1730s.150
Nevertheless, for many decades, counsel could perform only
limited functions at trial—a lawyer could examine and crossexamine witnesses but could not argue his client’s case to the
jury.151 Because of those restrictions, cross-examination was an
utterly central component of a criminal defense lawyer’s skill
set—Langbein calls it “nearly the only tool in defense counsel’s
kit.”152
The rule against felony counsel was a rule of
appearance in the trial court; it did not extend to pretrial
assistance.153 Nonetheless, if lawyers were not involved at trial,
147
See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 272; BEATTIE,
POLICING AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 95-97; LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 7.
148
See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 274-76; BEATTIE,
POLICING AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 104-07; KING, supra note 84, at 88;
LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 47, 273-74.
149
See J.M. Beattie, Scales of Justice: Defense Counsel and the English
Criminal Trial in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries, 9 LAW & HIST. REV. 221,
221 (1991) [hereinafter Beattie, Scales of Justice].
150
See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 356-57; LANGBEIN,
supra note 144, at 167-77; Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 226-30;
Landsman, supra note 76, at 533-48.
151
See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 171, 254-55. The right to full assistance
of counsel developed earlier in the American colonies than in England. See 1 CHROUST,
supra note 121, at 42-44.
152
LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 283; see also id. at 291-96; BEATTIE, CRIME
AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 361-62; Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at
234-35; Landsman, supra note 76, at 535-37, 539-42, 548-57.
153
See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 129. Moreover, even after lawyers were
permitted at trial, only barristers (counsel) could represent a defendant at trial, but
either barristers or solicitors (attorneys) might participate in pretrial hearings. See
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their involvement in pretrial hearings was probably rare at
best. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, lawyers began
A lawyer’s
to appear at some committal hearings.154
involvement would increase the likelihood of cross-examination
at such a proceeding. A lawyer would not have any greater
right to cross-examine than the client he represented; and if a
prisoner had a right to cross-examine, involvement of a lawyer
was by no means necessary to his exercise of that right;155 but
as a practical matter, the assistance of counsel would make it
more likely that any opportunity to cross-examine would be
exploited.156 Cross-examination at trial was already the most
important component of defense counsel’s work; a lawyer
seeking to justify his fee for assisting at a committal hearing
would likely take advantage of any opportunity to crossexamine the forum presented.157
As one might predict from those two developments,
sources from this period do indeed reveal the advent of crossexamination at some committal hearings, as well as the first
clear articulations of the view that opportunity to crossexamine—like presence—was a procedural right critical to the
admissibility of a Marian deposition. I examine those sources
in the following two sections, first considering reported cases
and treatises and then turning to other sources.
B.

Reported Cases and Treatises

Marian procedure collided with cross-examination
rights in the 1739 case of King v. Westbeer.158 The defendant
ALLYSON N. MAY, THE BAR AND THE OLD BAILEY, 1750-1850, at 89-90 (2003); infra
notes 194-204, 215-23 and accompanying text.
154
See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 278-79 (citing a
magistrate’s complaint from the 1740s about “Newgate Solicitors” at committal
hearings); BEATTIE, POLICING AND PUNISHMENT, supra note 82, at 112; MAY, supra
note 153, at 89-90; Beattie, Public Justice, supra note 83, at 33-35, 43-44; infra notes
194-223 and accompanying text. As these sources make clear, there is no substance to
Davies’ claim that it “goes without saying that, even if the arrestee had been present
for the taking of a witness’s Marian deposition, he would not have been represented by
counsel at that time.” Davies, supra note 5, at 170.
155
See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 54, 107 Eng. Rep. 15, 21 (K.B. 1822)
(Best, J.) (noting that “opportunity for cross-examination” need not include “crossexamining by counsel or attorney”).
156
See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 34-35 (noting that most prisoners
probably could not cross-examine effectively (quoting BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS,
supra note 84, at 350-51)); Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 234 (same).
157
In addition, increasing lawyer involvement at trial would tend to
crystallize evidentiary rules. See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 243.
158
1 Leach 12, 168 Eng. Rep. 108 (1739) (reported 1789).
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there was charged with theft; an accomplice, Lulham, had
implicated him in a committal examination but died before
trial. Defense counsel argued that “admitting his deposition to
be read in evidence would injure the prisoner, inasmuch as he
would lose the benefit which might otherwise have arisen from
The report continues: “The
a cross-examination.”159
[prosecution counsel] replied, and the point was very much
debated. But the Court over-ruled the objection, and admitted
Lulham’s information to be read; though they said it would not
be conclusive unless it were strongly corroborated by other
testimony.”160
Although Westbeer admitted an examination over the
objection that it denied the prisoner his right to cross-examine,
the case does not necessarily show that magistrates refused to
permit questioning by prisoners at committal hearings, or that
depositions were routinely taken in the prisoner’s absence. The
case is unusual in that the deposition was taken from an
accomplice at what appears to have been the accomplice’s own
committal hearing.161 The examination was thus conducted in
the prisoner’s (Lulham’s) presence but became ex parte when
read against a different defendant (Westbeer).
Those
circumstances suggest why the case was “very much debated”
and the court’s ruling so qualified. Courts in 1739 were not yet
willing to condition admissibility on presence or opportunity for
cross-examination, but in unusual cases where the normal
features of committal depositions were absent, their admission
was controversial.162
Contrast Westbeer with Woodcock and Dingler. In
Woodcock, the deposition was excluded because “[i]t was not
taken, as the statute directs, in a case where the prisoner was
brought before [the magistrate] in custody; the prisoner
159

Id. at 12, 168 Eng. Rep. at 109.
Id.; see also BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at 273 & n.15
(mentioning a similar unreported case from 1749).
161
The accomplice “made a full confession in writing” before giving his sworn
statement, Westbeer, 1 Leach at 12, 168 Eng. Rep. at 109; the unsworn confession
suggests the accomplice himself was being committed. Leach and Peake, however,
both apparently assumed the defendant was present. See 4 HAWKINS (1795), supra
note 11, at 423 (citing Westbeer for the point that an accomplice’s Marian deposition
was admissible if taken “in the presence of the prisoner”); PEAKE (1801), supra note 11,
at 40-41 (same).
162
Alternatively, the court’s corroboration requirement could reflect the more
general accomplice-corroboration rule rather than the ex parte character of the
testimony, although Langbein states that the accomplice-corroboration rule did not
emerge until the 1740s. LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 203.
160
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therefore had no opportunity of contradicting the facts it
contains.”163 The court thus treated presence as relevant not for
its own sake, but because it would afford the prisoner an
“opportunity of contradicting” the witness’s testimony. The use
of the word “contradict” rather than “cross-examine” presents
an ambiguity. But the defendant was not literally denied an
opportunity to “contradict” the witness; he could have given a
contradictory account at trial after the deposition was read.
Implicit in the court’s holding is that the defendant was denied
an opportunity to contradict the witness at a time when the
witness could be required to respond to the contradictions—
which is, in substance, an opportunity to cross-examine.164
Garrow’s argument in Dingler, as reported by Leach, is
unambiguous: “[W]hen [the statutory] course is pursued, the
prisoner may have, as he is entitled to have, the benefit of
cross-examination; but in the course which has been pursued
by Mr. Abingdon, as the prisoner was not present, no judicial
examination has been taken, as he could not have the benefit of
cross-examination.”165 Garrow thus saw opportunity to crossexamine as both a justification for the right to be present and
as a free-standing right to which the prisoner was “entitled.”
Another account of Dingler published in the Old Bailey
Sessions Papers in 1791 confirms the significance of crossexamination.166 In that report, Garrow sought to show what
mischief would ensue from ex parte depositions by posing a
hypothetical in which a witness testified ex parte that the
defendant had killed the victim but omitted that he had done
so in self-defense.167 Surely, Garrow argued, such a deposition,
“not taken in my presence, and without the advantage of cross163
King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 502, 168 Eng. Rep. 352, 353 (1789); see also
supra note 114. As noted supra note 105, the reference to “contradicting” does not
appear in the Old Bailey Sessions Papers report of the case.
164
It is true that presence would be advantageous to the prisoner even if he
could not ask questions. See Davies, supra note 5, at 172-73. But the advantages
Davies identifies seem unlikely to have been the ones the judge in Woodcock had in
mind. Absence might hamper a prisoner in preparing to contradict the witness at trial,
but it would be strange to describe that as a denial of the opportunity to contradict.
And while absence might also hamper a prisoner in defending himself at his committal
examination, the deposition in Woodcock was not taken in connection with any
committal hearing. The judge’s use of the word “contradict” rather than “crossexamine” might reflect an assumption that the prisoner at a committal hearing would
not question the witness directly, but would “contradict” his account and rely on the
magistrate to demand responses. Cf. infra note 224.
165
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 562, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791).
166
Trial of George Dingler, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 14, 1791, at 468.
167
Id. at 474.
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examination, taken behind my back, not containing all the
circumstances that he knows, but containing just so much as
shall justify my commitment,” could not be admitted.168 Garrow
then argued from the statutory text, as in Leach: “The
language of the statute is, that the Justice has nothing to do
but with a man coming before him to be committed. . . . [This]
was not in the course of a judicial examination; the prisoner
was not present; the prisoner was not on his defence . . . .”169
He then quoted at length from Woodcock.170
A colloquy ensued. The prosecution counsel inquired
what had happened to the prisoner after his committal
The magistrate replied:
“After I had
examination.171
committed him once, I sent for him again, that he might have
all the advantage he could make of it.”172 Garrow interjected:
“Had he the advantage of suggesting the questions to the
woman?”173 The magistrate conceded he had not.174 The
prosecution counsel then argued that, whether or not the
statute applied, the examination should be admitted as the
best evidence available.175 But “[t]he examination [was] not
allowed to be read.”176
In Leach’s report, the court sustained Garrow’s
objection “on the authority of the case cited” (Woodcock); we
cannot be sure how much of Garrow’s argument the court
accepted, although presumably it agreed with whatever was
implicit in Woodcock itself .177 The Old Bailey Sessions Papers
report suggests more strongly that inability to cross-examine
was relevant to the decision, though it too is ambiguous.
Whatever the basis for the court’s holding, however, the fact
that Garrow believed there was a right to cross-examine at a
committal hearing is significant in itself. Garrow was the most

168
169
170
171
172

Id.
Id. at 475.
Id. at 475-76.
Id. at 476.
Trial of George Dingler, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 14, 1791, at 468,

476.
173
174
175
176
177

Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 476-77.
Id. at 477.
King v. Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 563, 168 Eng. Rep. 383, 384 (1791).
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famous criminal defense lawyer of his time.178 That he thought
the right existed meant others probably did as well.
In 1794, Webb essentially replicated the reasoning of
Woodcock and Dingler without citing either decision. The court
held that the state’s committal statute “clearly implies the
depositions to be read, must be taken in [the prisoner’s]
presence”179—tracking the logic of Woodcock and Dingler that a
committal statute authorizes testimony only where the
prisoner is brought before the magistrate in custody. And, just
like Garrow in Dingler, the court then justified that presence
requirement on the ground that it would afford an opportunity
to cross-examine: “[I]t is a rule of the common law, founded on
natural justice, that no man shall be prejudiced by evidence
which he had not the liberty to cross examine . . . .”180
Treatises also endorsed the cross-examination rule to
varying degrees. A 1789 treatise cited Hawkins for the point
that “[t]he examination of an informer, taken on oath in
pursuance of the statutes of Philip & Mary, and subscribed by
him, may be given in evidence” if the witness becomes
unavailable.181 It then added: “This shews the propriety and
justice of permitting a prisoner by himself, or counsel to crossexamine any witness produced against him, before the
magistrate, though some justices have strenuously contended
against the right.”182
In 1795, Leach cited Woodcock and Dingler in his
seventh edition of Hawkins for the point that “an examination
of a person murderously wounded, taken by a justice of the
peace . . . in the absence of the prisoner, cannot be read in
evidence on the subsequent trial of the prisoner for murder, for
it is taken extrajudicially, and not as the statutes of Philip and
Mary direct, in a case where the prisoner is brought before him
in custody, and he has the opportunity of contradicting or
cross-examining as to the facts alledged.”183 In other words, the
Marian statutes “direct[ed]” that the prisoner have the
178
See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 243 (“the dominant Old Bailey barrister
of the day”); Landsman, supra note 76, at 551 (“one of the foremost counsel of the era”).
See generally Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 236-47.
179
State v. Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103, 104 (Super. L. 1794); see also supra
notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
180
Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) at 104.
181
1 JOHN MORGAN, ESSAYS UPON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE, NEW TRIALS,
SPECIAL VERDICTS, TRIALS AT BAR, AND REPLEADERS 431 (London 1789).
182
Id. I am indebted to Professor Davies for this reference.
183
4 HAWKINS (1795), supra note 11, at 423.
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“opportunity of contradicting or cross-examining” adverse
witnesses.
Later treatises and cases that conditioned
admissibility on opportunity for cross-examination often
similarly traced that requirement to Woodcock and Dingler.184
Marian examinations remained a source of controversy.
Importantly, however, the typical complaint was that the
opportunity for cross-examination at a committal hearing was
inadequate, not that there was no opportunity at all. An 1806
treatise, for example, criticized the rule of admissibility as
“very unsatisfactory” because Marian depositions were “taken
under circumstances, in which the adverse party had not a fair
opportunity of cross examination, or in which such an
examination, being unusual, could not reasonably be expected
to have taken place.”185 Among other things, the hearing was
limited to the issue of cause to commit rather than guilt, and
“the combating of the evidence by professional assistance, or by
An 1824
adverse testimony, is frequently disallowed.”186
treatise advocated a strict unavailability rule because “[i]t is
true that the prisoner has had the power to cross-examine the
witness, but this was at a time and under circumstances very
disadvantageous to the prisoner.”187 And a 1795 Virginia
manual decried the rule of admissibility on the ground that
“the accused party has not the same advantage of cross
examination, which he would possess before a court, with the
assistance of counsel.”188 These critiques are directed at the
adequacy of the opportunity to cross-examine afforded by a
committal hearing. None claims the accused might be denied
that opportunity altogether.
C.

Other Sources

Marian depositions themselves provide little evidence of
cross-examination. That may be due in large part to the
format: The depositions merely recount witnesses’ testimony;
184
See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842) (citing Woodcock
and Dingler); 1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79 & n.(l) (citing Woodcock and Dingler); 2
STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487-89 (citing Woodcock and Dingler); cf. Rex v. Smith,
Holt 614, 615-16, 171 Eng. Rep. 357, 360 (1817) (apparently citing Radbourne);
ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85 (citing Radbourne).
185
Evans, supra note 11, at 232 (emphasis added).
186
Id.
187
2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *487.
188
WILLIAM HENING, THE NEW VIRGINIA JUSTICE 148 (Richmond, Nicolson
1795) (emphasis added).
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they do not transcribe questions and answers verbatim, nor do
they report procedural colloquies between the magistrate and
prisoner (or counsel). There are a few instances of testimony
that might conceivably be a product of cross-examination. In
one case, for example, an accomplice initially implicates the
prisoners but then, in a passage of testimony apparently added
afterward, minimizes their involvement.189 In other cases,
witnesses admit not knowing particular facts in a manner
Overall,
arguably consistent with adverse questioning.190
however, the infrequency of such instances suggests that crossexamination was still rarely attempted; that it was attempted
but rarely permitted; or that it was conducted but the answers
rarely transcribed.191 The deposition format provides no means

189

See Examination of Robert Hutton against William Street & John
Maidwell, OBSP 1789 Jan/19 (Jan. 5, 1789) (first claiming that “William Street and
John Maidwell came to his said Master, with two Waggons loaded with Sacks” (some of
which were stolen), but later stating that “William Street was with his horses, and two
men not present brought the said sacks to him, not Maidwell which last declaration is
the Truth”). The latter passage appears in compressed writing, as if it were inserted
after the magistrate had already recorded the following witness’s testimony.
190
See Information of John Higgs against William Street & John Maidwell,
OBSP 1789 Jan/30 (Jan. 5, 1789) (stating that he “saw him [a prisoner] go forward
where Roots Waggon was but cannot say if he went there or not”); Information of
Phillip Jones against Francis Fleming et al., OBSP 1789 Feb/60 (Jan. 28, 1789)
(admitting he “does not know what became of the said Tire” that was stolen);
Information of John Thompson against Francis Fleming et al., OBSP 1789 Feb/60 (Jan.
28, 1789) (“[T]his Informant is not acquainted with the person of John Cumberledge [a
prisoner] says he might have been in Company—Knows Holmes alias Shock [a
prisoner] & thinks he was in his House does not recollect seeing Samuel Young alias
Leggy [an accomplice] but says he might have been there as there was many persons”);
Information of Daniel Adams against David Coleman, OBSP 1789 Ju/35 (May 6, 1789)
(stating that an allegedly forged draft “was presented for payment but by whom this
Informant cannot say”); Information of Fredreck Seabeck against Eleanor Hays, OBSP
1789 Dec/54 (Nov. 28, 1789) (stating that “a Man and four Women came into the Room
(but does not know who they were)”).
191
The third possibility cannot be discounted. Although authorities generally
advised the magistrate to record all testimony, exculpatory as well as inculpatory, see,
e.g., 1 CHITTY, supra note 11, at 79; MICHAEL DALTON, THE COUNTREY JUSTICE 265
(London 1618), the Marian statutes by their terms required the magistrate to take
down only so much testimony “as shall be material to prove the Felony,” 2 & 3 Phil. &
M., c. 10 (1555). Selective transcription remained a source of controversy into the
nineteenth century. See People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 293, 304-05 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842)
(holding that a magistrate erred where “neither the questions nor answers [during
cross-examination] were put down, because [he] did not think it material to put them
down”); Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749, 755 (1849) (chastising a magistrate for writing
down only “so much [testimony] as he considered material”); cf. Evans, supra note 11,
at 232 (“[I]t is a very hard measure, that an authentic record may be taken of the
evidence which tends to criminate, while there is not an equal opportunity of
preserving the materials of defence.”). It may be that some magistrates would not
record a witness’s responses to cross-examination unless they substantially
undermined his other testimony.
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of distinguishing among those possibilities.192
Fortunately, other sources shed more light.193
Particularly significant is an unreported case from 1780,
Ayrton v. Addington.194 The case was a civil suit by Thomas
Ayrton, an attorney, against William Addington, a magistrate
presiding at Bow Street in London.195 The dispute arose from a
felony robbery charge brought by a third man, Webb, against a
fourth, Wilson.196 Wilson’s master had hired Ayrton to assist
Wilson in his Marian committal hearing before Addington.197
According to witnesses in the civil case, when Webb testified at
the hearing, Ayrton sought to ask him “cross-questions”
concerning the crime.198 Addington informed the attorney that
this was “not a trial but an examination of prisoners” and that
“he would not suffer him to examine,” although the attorney
could suggest questions for the magistrate to ask.199 Ayrton
replied that this was “very odd,” and “insisted he had a right to
ask the [witness] any questions”—“the right as an Attorney to
put any question for the benefit of his client.”200 Ayrton
persisted in his cross-examination, interrupting Addington’s
own questioning, and Addington ordered him removed.201
Ayrton then sued Addington for assault and false
imprisonment.202 In defense, Addington pled justification,
claiming that Ayrton had interfered with his official duties.203
The jury, however, returned a verdict for Ayrton, who

192
As explained supra note 85, I excluded from my deposition sample cases
where the prisoner appeared pro se at trial, in an effort to find cases where the prisoner
might also have been represented by counsel at the committal hearing (which seemed
more likely to yield evidence of cross-examination). Nevertheless, the depositions did
not yield any evidence of lawyer involvement. It is unclear whether that is because
lawyers were rarely involved or because magistrates saw no need to note their
involvement.
193
I owe many of the following references to John Beattie.
194
Ayrton v. Addington (Dec. 7, 1780), in 2 JAMES OLDHAM, THE MANSFIELD
MANUSCRIPTS AND THE GROWTH OF ENGLISH LAW IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1023
(1992).
195
Id. at 1023-24.
196
Id. at 1024.
197
Id.
198
Id.
199
Id. at 1025-26 (“[I]f he would put any question to him, & if he thought it
proper, he would put it.”).
200
2 OLDHAM, supra note 194, at 1024-26.
201
Id. at 1026.
202
Id. at 1023.
203
Id. at 1024.
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recovered one shilling in damages and £50 in court costs.204
Implicit in the verdict, evidently, is the jury’s approval of
Ayrton’s conduct at the hearing. The case shows that, even in
1780, a right to cross-examine witnesses at committal hearings
was thought to exist not only by a member of the legal
profession but by the public at large.
Ayrton v. Addington is not the only instance of
attempted cross-examination at a committal hearing. Early
press accounts reveal at least two others, though with mixed
results. In a 1774 case reported in the General Evening Post,
John Matchem was charged with the robbery of two men,
Lincon and Fidel.205 At the Bow Street committal hearing,
Matchem was assisted by counsel who, “from the improbability
of the prisoner being the offender, moved to cross-examine
Lincon and Fidel.”206 According to the press account, however,
“the Bench seemed unwilling to admit of such a proceeding.”207
Lincon and Fidel testified at trial, so Matchem was not
ultimately denied the opportunity to cross-examine.208
Nevertheless, the case suggests that the right to cross-examine
at a committal hearing was not firmly established at that time.
By contrast, in a 1786 examination for arson reported in
the Daily Universal Register, cross-examination not only was
permitted, but resulted in the exoneration of the prisoners.209
The principal witness at the hearing was the prisoners’ maid,
who claimed they had directed her to set the fire.210 But “on her
cross-examination by Mr. MacNally, who was counsel for the
prisoners, she acknowledged that she had not accused her
master and mistress, till after she was informed of her own
danger [of being charged with the offense], and that to save
herself she became evidence [for the prosecution].”211 The
magistrates then discharged the prisoners for want of
evidence.212
204

Id. at 1026. The trial was significant enough to be reported in the British
Mercury, although without any relevant details. See BRIT. MERCURY & EVENING
ADVERTISER, Dec. 9, 1780, at 4; BRIT. MERCURY & EVENING ADVERTISER, Dec. 11, 1780,
at 3.
205
GEN. EVENING POST, June 14-16, 1774, at 3.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
See Trial of John Mattsham, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, July 6, 1774, at
243, 243-53.
209
DAILY UNIVERSAL REG., June 5, 1786, at 3.
210
Id.
211
Id.
212
Id.
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Cross-examination at committal hearings was also a
point of controversy in the colonies. In 1766, colonists in New
York complained to the authorities that “During the Course of
the Examination of the Witnesses [a particular justice] would
not admit any of the prisoners to ask or propose one Single
Question to the Witnesses nor suffer anyone to do it in their
Ste[a]d.”213 According to the complainants, this was one of
“several violent and arbitrary steps . . . manifestly tending to
the subversion of the invaluable privilege of English Subjects
they conceive [o]ught not to pass unnoticed.”214
By 1801, lawyer participation in committal hearings
had become sufficiently common that a group of Lancaster
magistrates sought legal advice on their rights. Complaining
that “[i]t frequently occurs upon the Examination of Persons
charged with Felony, that Attornies are employed on their
behalf to attend at their Examinations,” they posed a series of
questions to five members of the bar, which were published
that year with the answers in a pamphlet.215 The principal
questions were whether attorney attendance at a committal
hearing was by right or by discretion, and whether the attorney
was entitled to copies of the examinations.216 Most respondents
thought that attorney attendance was a matter of discretion
and that copies of the examinations should not be given out.217
As relevant here, however, the magistrates also inquired
whether an attorney had a right “to cross examine the
Witnesses as if on Trial.”218

213

JULIUS GOEBEL JR. & T. RAYMOND NAUGHTON, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN
COLONIAL NEW YORK: A STUDY IN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1664-1776, at 635 (1944)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
214
Id. Davies cites the same page of this source for the point that “ ‘[t]he royal
officials in New York do not seem to have admitted any right to cross-examination at a
preliminary hearing,’ ” Davies, supra note 5, at 188 n.269 (quoting GOEBEL &
NAUGHTON, supra note 213, at 635), but omits the fact that this refusal was the subject
of colonial protest.
215
COPY OF CASE [SUBMITTED TO COUNSEL BY THE MAGISTRATES OF THE
COUNTY OF LANCASTER] AND OPINIONS 3 (Manchester, Shelmerdine & Co. 1801)
(British Library shelfmark T.1177.(1.); copy on file with author).
216
Id. at 5-7.
217
Id. at 5-18. In 1822, the King’s Bench definitively held that there was no
right to counsel at a committal hearing, see Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 107 Eng.
Rep. 15 (K.B. 1822), although one judge noted that, “in practice, magistrates do permit,
on many occasions, the presence of advocates for the parties accused,” id. at 49, 107
Eng. Rep. at 19 (Abbott, C.J.), and another opined that “it may be very useful for a
magistrate to grant [counsel] in many cases, and it is to be presumed that he will do so
on all proper occasions,” id. at 51, 107 Eng. Rep. at 20 (Bayley, J.).
218
COPY OF CASE AND OPINIONS, supra note 215, at 5.
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Three respondents addressed that issue. The most
expansive view was taken by a Mr. Topping, who stated:
I conceive . . . that a Prisoner has a Right to have the Benefit of legal
Advice upon his Examination if he chooses it . . . . [A]nd if a Prisoner
has a Right to the Assistance of a professional Man upon his
Examination before a Magistrate, it seems to me that such
professional Person may examine the Witnesses produced against
him, in doing this, if he conducts himself contemptuously or
indecently towards the Magistrate in the Execution of his Duty, he is
liable to Punishment.219

At the other extreme was Mr. Serjeant Shepherd, who stated
that a lawyer did not have “any right to cross examine the
Witnesses.”220 Nevertheless, Shepherd explained:
The best Advice I can give to the Magistrates, is the Rule I should
lay down myself were I in the Commission; if an Attorney of
Character and proper Demeanor, or a Counsel of Integrity, attended
in order to give a Prisoner fair Advice, I should always permit it, and
having heard him state the Question he wished to put on Crossexamination, if it tended fairly to elucidate the Truth and protect the
Prisoner, I should permit it; but I would not permit a general and
desultory Cross-examination . . . .221

Third was the ubiquitous William Garrow, whose response was
ambiguous but seemed to assume that a lawyer permitted to
attend should be allowed to cross-examine:
There cannot exist a Right in any professional or other Person to
interrupt the Magistrate, but I think it is incident to his Attendance
that such Person should be permitted to advise the Prisoner as to his
Conduct, nor do I think it would be proper to prevent such
professional Persons making Minutes of what may pass, with respect
to Cross-examination, I think the Magistrate may easily prevent this
being extended to an inconvenient Degree, by observing that the
Person is not now upon his Trial, that it is the Duty of the
Magistrate to commit, that the Prisoner will have an Opportunity of
making a full Defence upon his Trial, for which Occasion it will be
for his Advantage to reserve himself.222

219

Id. at 16-17.
Id. at 10; cf. id. at 5-6 (Edward Law) (stating that the magistrate “may
prescribe the Terms upon which alone he will allow” attorney attendance).
221
Id. at 11.
222
Id. at 15.
220
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In sum, while the respondents differed over whether crossexamination was by right or by discretion, all three agreed it
should normally be allowed to some degree.223
D.

Conclusion

The evidence in the preceding two sections suggests
that, at the time of the framing, the right to cross-examine at a
committal hearing was not firmly established, but nor was the
absence of such a right firmly established. Rather, there was
disagreement over the point. Most criminal lawyers probably
thought the right existed; most magistrates probably thought it
did not; other opinion was divided. Cross-examination was
probably still uncommon, so even those who thought the right
existed likely expected only that the prisoner should be
permitted to cross-examine, not that cross-examination would
often actually occur. Some thought the prisoner could not
question witnesses directly, but could suggest questions for the
magistrate to ask.224 Opinion was clearly shifting in favor of
the right to cross-examine over time. And some who thought
there was no such right nevertheless thought an opportunity to
cross-examine should be afforded as a matter of discretion.225
223
Furthermore, it is unclear to what extent the disagreement over counsel’s
right to cross-examine reflected disagreement over the right to cross-examine or merely
disagreement over the right to counsel. When the King’s Bench held in 1822 that there
was no right to counsel at a committal hearing, one judge clearly implied that the
prisoner himself could still cross-examine. See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 54, 107
Eng. Rep. 15, 21 (K.B. 1822) (Best, J.) (“It has been argued that a prisoner under
examination should have the assistance of an attorney, to cross-examine the witnesses
for the Crown, the depositions taken being, in certain cases, evidence against him, on
account of his having had an opportunity for cross-examination. But this does not
mean cross-examining by counsel or attorney, for that formerly was not allowed to a
prisoner, even on his trial.”); cf. id. at 51, 107 Eng. Rep. at 20 (Bayley, J.) (“[I]f the
party be really innocent, he will himself be able to suggest to the magistrate all such
matters as may tend to elucidate the truth.”).
224
Even at trial, cross-examination was sometimes intermediated by the
judge. See LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 16. Permitting the prisoner to suggest
questions for the magistrate to ask therefore probably would have been viewed by
many as substantially respecting any right to cross-examine.
225
These conclusions are largely consistent with other observations about
pretrial practice in this era. See BEATTIE, CRIME AND THE COURTS, supra note 84, at
273-74 (stating that the cross-examination rule’s applicability to Marian depositions
was “plainly at issue by 1750” and “accepted in its most general terms” by 1790 or soon
thereafter); id. at 277 (“[B]y the end of the eighteenth century . . . [the] crossexamination of the prosecution witnesses . . . had produced a new kind of magistrates’
hearing.”); id. at 280-81 (“The public pretrial enquiry [in the eighteenth century] also
enlarged the possibility that a suspected offender, aided by a lawyer, might challenge
the evidence upon which his commitment to trial would be based . . . .”); KING, supra
note 84, at 97 (“[T]he eighteenth century witnessed a gradual growth in concern about
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CROSS-EXAMINATION – THE BROADER PICTURE

Conflicting historical evidence poses problems for
constitutional interpretation.
It transforms an effort to
discover a single, universally accepted original meaning into an
effort to determine which of two plausible meanings
predominated. In those circumstances, it makes sense to
consider a broader range of historical evidence and the
inferences reasonably drawn from that evidence.
A.

Consistency

The Confrontation Clause is phrased in categorical
terms and was designed to secure a procedure the Framers
thought fundamental over a broad range of circumstances.226 In
the face of conflicting direct evidence, therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that an interpretation that results in
consistent and rational application over a range of
circumstances is more likely to reflect original meaning than
one that results in arbitrary distinctions. Evidence concerning
other forms of testimony beyond felony committal examinations
is therefore relevant. That evidence shows two things. First,
in a wide variety of circumstances, English law required that
testimony be given in the presence of the accused. Second, the
principal justification for that requirement was that it would
afford the accused an opportunity for cross-examination.
Testimony at trial has long conformed to those
principles. Blackstone and Hale waxed eloquent about the
English tradition of live oral testimony and identified the
opportunity to propound “occasional questions” upon witnesses

the rights of the accused at preliminary hearings . . . linked to, and perhaps caused by,
the fact that lawyers began to appear at some summary hearings in this period.”);
LANGBEIN, supra note 144, at 274-75 (noting that in the late eighteenth century, “[a]t
least in London, the magistrate’s pretrial inquiry increasingly took on the trappings of
a public hearing” and “became an occasion at which a defense lawyer could challenge
the prosecution case”); Beattie, Scales of Justice, supra note 149, at 250 (noting the
practice “by the end of the eighteenth century” of “allowing the accused to be
represented at the preliminary hearing by counsel, who might cross-examine the
evidence upon which a committal to trial might be based”). Davies dismisses London
as an “aberration,” Davies, supra note 5, at 201 n.306, but practices in London are
uniquely relevant because they are the ones to which Americans studying in England
would have been exposed. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
226
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
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as a primary benefit of that tradition.227 Hawkins wrote
broadly that “in Cases of Life no Evidence is to be given against
a Prisoner but in his Presence,”228 and he justified the hearsay
rule in part on the ground that hearsay denied the accused an
“Opportunity of a cross Examination.”229 Finally, I noted above
the centrality of cross-examination to a criminal defense
lawyer’s work in the eighteenth century.230
Opportunity for cross-examination was also a settled
requirement in various pretrial contexts. On the civil side, for
example, it was clear that depositions could not otherwise be
read. According to Gilbert, it would be “against natural
Justice” to admit a deposition against someone who “had not
Liberty to cross-examine the Witnesses.”231
A comparable rule applied to non-felony criminal cases.
Whatever else Paine stands for, it clearly holds that
opportunity to cross-examine is a necessary condition to the
admissibility of a deposition in a misdemeanor case, even if the
witness is dead. The sole ground for decision in Modern, and
the first of two alternative grounds in Comberbach and Holt,
was that the prisoner was not present and so had lost the

227
See 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 38, at 373 (1768) (“[T]he occasional
questions of the judge, the jury, and the counsel, propounded to the witnesses on a
sudden, will sift out the truth much better than a formal set of interrogatories
previously penned and settled . . . .”); MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY AND ANALYSIS OF
THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 258 (London, Nutt 1713) (“[B]y this Course of personal
and open Examination, there is Opportunity for all Persons concern’d, viz. The Judge,
or any of the Jury, or Parties, or their Council or Attornies, to propound occasional
Questions, which beats and bolts out the Truth much better than when the Witness
only delivers a formal Series of his Knowledge without being interrogated . . . .”).
228
2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 428 (footnote omitted).
229
Id. at 431 (“As to the second Particular, viz. How far Hearsay is Evidence:
It seems agreed, That what a Stranger has been heard to say is in Strictness no
Manner of Evidence either for or against a Prisoner, not only because it is not upon
Oath, but also because the other Side hath no Opportunity of a cross
Examination . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). Throughout the eighteenth century, the
principal justification for the hearsay rule remained absence of oath. See LANGBEIN,
supra note 144, at 245. But cf. Thomas Y. Davies, Not “the Framers’ Design”: How the
Framing-Era Ban Against Hearsay Evidence Refutes the Crawford-Davis “Testimonial”
Formulation of the Scope of the Original Confrontation Clause, 15 J.L. & POL’Y
(forthcoming 2007). The admissibility of Marian depositions, however, was not
typically analyzed as a hearsay issue. Depositions were testimony, not hearsay; the
question was how testimony must be given, not whether hearsay should be allowed.
Cf. Davies, supra note 5, at 194.
230
See supra notes 151-52 and accompanying text.
231
GILBERT (1754), supra note 76, at 47 (“A Deposition can’t be given in
Evidence against any Person that was not Party to the Suit, and the Reason is, because
he had not Liberty to cross-examine the Witnesses, and ’tis against natural Justice
that a Man should be concluded in a Cause to which he never was a Party.”).
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opportunity to cross-examine.232 The case has been cited
throughout the centuries as standing for some crossexamination rule.233 Cross-examination was not a sufficient
condition to admissibility,234 and there is room for debate over
Paine’s applicability to felonies,235 but neither qualification
diminishes the case’s core holding.
In treason cases, confrontation was secured by statute.
A series of enactments dating back to the sixteenth century
granted the defendant the right to confront witnesses “face to
face” at his arraignment.236 The statutes did not mention a
right to cross-examine. But when Hale discussed them in his
treatise, he justified the presence requirement on the ground
that it would afford an opportunity for cross-examination.237
Justices of the peace had summary jurisdiction to try
certain minor criminal offenses, and a 1745 case seemed to
allow depositions in such cases even if taken in the prisoner’s
absence.238 In 1761, however, the King’s Bench effectively
overruled that decision in Rex v. Vipont and held unanimously
232
King v. Paine, 5 Mod. 163, 165, 87 Eng. Rep. 584, 585 (K.B. 1696) (“the
defendant not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had lost
the benefit of a cross-examination”); Rex v. Pain, Comb. 358, 359, 90 Eng. Rep. 527, 527
(K.B. 1697) (“the defendant was not present when the examination was taken, so that
he could not cross-examine him”); Rex v. Pain, Holt 294, 294, 90 Eng. Rep. 1062, 1062
(K.B. 1697) (same).
233
See, e.g., 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra note 38, at 430; GILBERT (1754), supra
note 76, at 100; King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 722-23, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 824 (K.B. 1790)
(Kenyon, C.J.); ARCHBOLD, supra note 11, at *85; State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607,
610 (App. L. 1835); People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 300 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); 3 WIGMORE,
supra note 49, § 1364, at 22 & n.52.
234
Authority to examine was also required. See supra Part I.B.
235
See supra Part I.B.
236
See, e.g., 13 Car. 2, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (“[N]o person or persons shall be indicted
arraigned condemned convicted or attainted for any of the Treasons or Offences
aforesaid unless the same Offender or Offenders be thereof accused by the Testimony
and deposition of two lawful and credible Witnesses upon Oath which Witnesses at the
time of the said Offender or Offenders’ arraignment shall be brought in person before
him or them face to face and shall openly avow and maintain upon Oath what they
have to say against him or them concerning the Treason or Offences contained in the
said Indictment unless the party or parties arraigned shall willingly without violence
confess the same.”). Earlier treason statutes included an exception for dead witnesses
(but not unavailable witnesses generally); that exception was deleted from later
statutes. Compare 5 & 6 Edw. 6, c. 11, § 9 (1552) (“if they be then living”), 1 & 2 Phil.
& M., c. 10, § 11 (1554) (“if they be then living and within the Realm”), 1 Eliz., c. 1, § 21
(1559) (“so many of them as shall be living and within this Realm”), and 1 Eliz., c. 5,
§ 10 (1559) (“if they be then living”), with 13 Eliz., c. 1, § 9 (1571) (no death exception),
and 13 Car. 2, c. 1, § 5 (1661) (no death exception).
237
1 HALE, supra note 23, at 306 (“[T]he statute requires, that [the witnesses]
be produced upon the arraignment in the presence of the prisoner to the end that he
may cross examine them.”).
238
See Rex v. Baker, 2 Strange 1240, 93 Eng. Rep. 1156 (K.B. 1745).
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that testimony must be given in the prisoner’s presence.239
Each of the judges justified that requirement on the ground
that presence would ensure the defendant an opportunity to
cross-examine.240 The court reaffirmed that rule in 1786.241
This line of cases is particularly significant because the justices
of the peace whom Vipont required to allow cross-examination
in summary proceedings were the same justices who
administered committal hearings under the Marian statutes.
Langbein reports that examination techniques did not vary
across those two contexts.242 In some cases, it might not even
be clear at the outset whether an examination would terminate
in summary conviction or felony committal.243 A right to crossexamine in summary proceedings would not necessarily imply
a right to cross-examine in committal hearings (only the former
Nonetheless, crossinvolves a determination of guilt).244
examination would have seemed more natural in a committal
hearing once magistrates had to allow cross-examination in
their other proceedings.
Even in felony cases, the Marian statutes applied only
to committal examinations and coroners’ depositions245—not to
other forms of testimony that might be generated, such as prior
trial testimony,246 warrant applications,247 or preservation
239

2 Burr. 1163, 97 Eng. Rep. 767 (K.B. 1761).
Id. at 1165, 97 Eng. Rep. at 768 (Mansfield, J.) (“[E]vidence . . . must be
given in the presence of the defendant, that he may have an opportunity of crossexamining.”); id. at 1165, 97 Eng. Rep. at 769 (Denison, J.) (“The evidence must be
given in the presence of the defendant, that he may have an opportunity to crossexamine.”); id. at 1166, 97 Eng. Rep. at 769 (Wilmot, J.) (“The witnesses ought to be
examined in the presence of the party accused; that he may have the benefit of crossexamination.”). The court did not expressly address unavailable witnesses.
241
See King v. Crowther, 1 T.R. 125, 127, 99 Eng. Rep. 1009, 1011 (K.B. 1786);
see also id. at 126, 99 Eng. Rep. at 1010 (counsel’s argument) (“It was a principle in our
law that the evidence must be given in the presence of the defendant, that he might
have an opportunity of cross-examining the witness.”).
242
LANGBEIN, supra note 19, at 76-77, 93-95.
243
See KING, supra note 84, at 89 (noting that magistrates faced with felony
accusations would sometimes summarily convict for minor offenses such as vagrancy
rather than commit for trial).
244
See Cox v. Coleridge, 1 B. & C. 37, 50, 107 Eng. Rep. 15, 20 (K.B. 1822)
(Bayley, J.) (making the same distinction as to the right to counsel); COPY OF CASE AND
OPINIONS, supra note 215, at 10-14 (Shepherd) (same).
245
See supra notes 17-18; see also Davies, supra note 5, at 142 (acknowledging
that “later treatise writers seem to have read Paine to also prohibit the use of a
deposition of an unavailable witness in a felony trial if the deposition were improperly
taken outside of Marian procedure”).
246
See, e.g., Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895); United States
v. Wood, 28 F. Cas. 754 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1818) (No. 16,756); Summons v. State, 5 Ohio St.
325, 342-43 (1856); State v. Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 229 (1807); Finn v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) 701, 708 (Gen. Ct. 1827); 2 HAWKINS (1721), supra
240
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depositions.248 But what about coroners’ depositions? Their
admissibility had been settled since Lord Morly’s case in
1666.249 And, as Professor Davies notes, the coroner’s inquest
could occur before anyone was accused or arrested, so there is
no obvious reason to assume the eventual defendant would be
present.250
Nevertheless, there is evidence that those who did
attend the inquest could cross-examine witnesses. In a 1742
London trial, the defendant’s attorney testified: “[O]n the 4th of
May, I went to Staines to attend the Coroner’s Jury; though, as
I had not Time to enquire into the Fact, and prepare for Mr.
Annesley’s Defence, I could do him but little Service more, than
by cross examining the Witnesses for the Crown, and making
Observations on their Evidence . . . .”251 Furthermore, in 1790,
Chief Justice Kenyon in Eriswell explained the admissibility of
coroners’ depositions on the ground that “the examination
before the coroner is an inquest of office; it is a transaction of
notoriety, to which every person has a right of access.”252 It
note 38, at 430. Davies criticizes Crawford ’s reliance on Atkins and Finn, see Davies,
supra note 5, at 180 & n.235; Davies, supra note 10, at 626, but those cases do support
the only proposition for which Crawford cited them—that some courts excluded prior
testimony on confrontation grounds even though the defendant had an earlier
opportunity to cross-examine. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004);
Atkins, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) at 229 (prior trial testimony would “go a great length in
overthrowing this wise provision of the Constitution”); id. (counsel’s argument) (relying
on “the Constitution, which provided that the witnesses should be confronted with the
accused”); Finn, 26 Va. (5 Rand.) at 708 (“In a civil action, if a witness who has been
examined in a former trial between the same parties, and on the same issue, is since
dead, what he swore to on the former trial, may be given in evidence, for the evidence
was given on oath; and the party had an opportunity of cross-examining him. But we
cannot find that the rule has ever been allowed in a criminal case; indeed, it is said to
be expressly otherwise.” (citations omitted)). I agree the cases are not directly relevant
here, because they involved prior trial testimony, not Marian depositions.
247
See, e.g., Collier v. State, 13 Ark. 676, 677 (1853); State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2
Hill) 607, 608 (App. L. 1835).
248
See, e.g., People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 293 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); King v.
Dingler, 2 Leach 561, 168 Eng. Rep. 383 (1791); King v. Woodcock, 1 Leach 500, 168
Eng. Rep. 352 (1789); Case of Thatcher & Waller, T. Jones 53, 84 Eng. Rep. 1143 (K.B.
1676).
249
See supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
250
Davies, supra note 5, at 171-72. At most, of course, Davies’ argument
suggests only that there was no cross-examination rule for coroners’ depositions. It has
no bearing on the cross-examination rule applicable to committal examinations, which
derived from the particular statutory text governing committal procedure. See supra
notes 125-27 and accompanying text.
251
Trial of James Annesley, Old Bailey Sessions Papers, July 15, 1742, at 1,
25.
252
King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 722, 100 Eng. Rep. 815, 824 (K.B. 1790)
(Kenyon, C.J.); see also 2 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *492 (“The only plausible ground
upon which such a distinction [between coroners’ depositions and committal
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thus appears that coroners’ depositions were admissible on the
theory that, since inquests were notorious proceedings of which
everyone was presumed to be aware, those who failed to show
up to cross-examine had simply neglected their rights.
American cases refused to admit coroners’ depositions,
declining to follow English precedents or making only halfOne stated that,
hearted attempts to reconcile them.253
whatever the English rule, the use of such ex parte depositions
had “never been permitted in this country.”254 The leading case
asked of defendants rhetorically: “[S]hall they all be assumed
per leges [i.e., by operation of law], to have neglected, though
absent, the time of cross-examination? Because our Act is
general for all inquests, the examination public, and of high
respectability? On the contrary, is there not too much of mere
formula, if not fiction, in such a notion?”255 The perceived
English rule these cases rejected thus did not condone ex parte
testimony. Rather, it presumed opportunity to cross-examine
from the notoriety of the proceeding. That presumption was
not very realistic, so the practical effect was to admit ex parte
depositions.256 But the very fact that English authorities
rationalized that result speaks volumes about the legal
landscape.
In a wide variety of contexts, therefore, admissibility
depended on presence, and presence was relevant because it
afforded an opportunity to cross-examine.
Principles of
consistency therefore favor a cross-examination requirement
for Marian depositions. Furthermore, the fact that opportunity
to cross-examine was routinely identified as the reason
presence was important—even when the governing statute said
nothing about cross-examination—is instructive. Some sources
conditioned the admissibility of a Marian examination on the
examinations] can be supported, seems to be this, that a proceeding before the coroner
is a matter so notorious, that every one may be presumed to have notice of it, and
consequently to have had an opportunity of cross-examining the witness. This however
is a reason far from satisfactory.”).
253
See State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 124, 131-32 (App. L. 1844); State
v. Houser, 26 Mo. 431, 436 (1858); People v. Restell, 3 Hill 289, 297 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1842); State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 610 (App. L. 1835).
254
Houser, 26 Mo. at 436.
255
Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) at 129.
256
See, e.g., PEAKE (1808), supra note 47, at 64 n.(m) (“[T]he practice has been
to admit [coroners’ depositions] after the death of the witness, without inquiry whether
the party was present or not . . . .”); cf. King v. Eriswell, 3 T.R. 707, 710 n.(c), 100 Eng.
Rep. 815, 817 n.(c) (K.B. 1790) (reporter’s note 1797) (“Nor [are committal depositions
admissible] since that statute, unless the party accused be present, though an
examination before a coroner is . . . .”).
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prisoner’s presence without mentioning cross-examination.257
This background suggests that opportunity to cross-examine
may nevertheless have been an implicit justification for the
presence requirement stated in those sources.258
B.

Subsequent History

For the most part, the preceding sections have
examined only sources roughly contemporaneous with the
framing or older, referring to later materials only to shed light
on specific earlier ones. As noted at the outset, however, the
more general subsequent history is quite one-sided. Between
1795 and 1824, at least eleven English treatises or case reports
conditioned admissibility on presence or opportunity for crossexamination; between 1794 and 1858, at least sixteen reported
American cases did so.259 By contrast, I am not aware of any
English source from later than the early 1790s suggesting that
a Marian committal examination would be admissible even if
taken ex parte. And I have not found a single reported case
from any American jurisdiction—not one—that has ever made
that claim. That subsequent history is relevant to original
meaning. Subsequent conduct in conformity with a particular
interpretation of a contract is evidence of the parties’ intent; no
less is true of the Constitution.
Professor Davies deems later sources irrelevant because
“conditions changed rapidly during the early decades of the
Republic.”260 Clearly, however, that goes to weight rather than
admissibility. How committal examinations were conducted in,
say, 1821—and what conditions attached to their
admissibility—is plainly some evidence of practices and legal
rules a few decades earlier. Later evidence might reflect new
developments instead, but that sort of uncertainty is inherent
in any source not precisely contemporaneous with the framing:
Post-framing
evidence
might
reflect
post-framing
257

See various authorities cited supra notes 11-13.
In contexts not involving formal depositions, it may be less likely that
presence was relevant in order to afford an opportunity to cross-examine. For example,
courts sometimes conditioned admissibility of relatively informal hearsay statements
on the prisoner’s presence. See, e.g., Trial of John Ilford, Old Bailey Sessions Papers,
Dec. 8, 1757, at 10, 10 (accusatory statement to private party); Trial of Thomas Fitzroy,
Old Bailey Sessions Papers, Sept. 16, 1801, at 525, 526 (statements to constable).
Cross-examination may have been very difficult in those circumstances. I owe these
two references to Richard Friedman.
259
See sources cited supra notes 11-13.
260
Davies, supra note 5, at 179.
258
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developments, but pre-framing evidence might be obsolete.
The historical record should be evaluated as a whole, giving
most weight to sources closest to the framing—not by ignoring
subsequent authorities entirely because of the mere possibility
that they might reflect subsequent developments.261
As to post-framing English sources, little needs to be
added to what I have already said with respect to Radbourne,
Woodcock, and Dingler.262 If an 1821 American source is
relevant to American meaning in 1789, then Ayrton’s 1780 civil
suit is relevant to English meaning in 1748; Garrow’s 1791
argument is relevant to English meaning in 1759; and the 1801
responses to the Lancaster magistrates’ queries are relevant to
English meaning in 1769. More than a hundred American
lawyers trained in London over that period, observing English
practices and absorbing English conceptions of legal rights.
Crawford ’s reliance on post-framing authorities is
hardly novel. Justices Scalia and Thomas routinely rely on
comparable or later American authorities to interpret the
Constitution. In Apprendi v. New Jersey, for example, Justice
Thomas derived the original meaning of the jury-trial right by
examining state cases from “the founding to roughly the end of
the Civil War, . . . particularly from the 1840’s on,” and
continued his review through the end of the nineteenth
century.263 Other opinions relying heavily on state cases from
that era include Justice Thomas’s opinion for the Court in
Wilson v. Arkansas (knock and announce),264 Justice Scalia’s
plurality in Harmelin v. Michigan (cruel and unusual
punishment),265 and Justice Scalia’s dissents in County of
Riverside v. McLaughlin (pretrial detention)266 and Grady v.
Corbin (double jeopardy).267 Still further examples abound.268
261

Davies also argues that later American decisions might reflect postframing English developments. See id. at 180 n.234. Even if so, American courts chose
to follow those developments as consistent with their own understanding of the law.
262
See supra notes 119-27 and accompanying text.
263
530 U.S. 466, 501-18 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring).
264
514 U.S. 927, 933 (1995) (Thomas, J.).
265
501 U.S. 957, 982-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion).
266
500 U.S. 44, 61-62 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
267
495 U.S. 508, 533-35 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
268
See, e.g., Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301-02 (2004) (Scalia, J.)
(citing 1872 treatise to construe jury-trial right); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S.
615, 629-31 & n.2 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) (citing late nineteenthcentury cases to construe search-incident-to-arrest authority under Fourth
Amendment); Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 94 (1998) (Scalia, J., concurring)
(citing late nineteenth-century treatise to interpret Fourth Amendment); United States
v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 516-19 (1995) (Scalia, J.) (citing late nineteenth-century cases
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Justices Scalia and Thomas also routinely rely on postframing English authorities.269 Leach’s Crown Cases has been
cited as constitutional authority throughout the Court’s
history.270 Mattox, the Court’s seminal 1895 Confrontation
Clause decision, relied on Radbourne itself.271 While Davies
would presumably dismiss every one of these citations as an
invalid use of historical evidence, the more reasonable
to establish absence of exception to jury-trial right); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 626 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (citing 1882 treatise to interpret Eighth
Amendment); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 215 & nn.1-2 (1992) (Scalia, J.,
concurring in judgment) (citing late nineteenth-century statutes to interpret First
Amendment); Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 154 n.4 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(citing late nineteenth-century case on shackling); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S.
621, 624 (1991) (Scalia, J.) (citing 1862 case to interpret Fourth Amendment); Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717, 724 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (citing cases through 1831 to
interpret Full Faith and Credit Clause); cf. United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,
345 (1998) (Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Scalia, J., et al.) (citing late nineteenthcentury cases to interpret Excessive Fines Clause).
269
See, e.g., Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629-31 & n.2 (Scalia, J., concurring in
judgment) (citing nineteenth-century English cases to interpret search-incident-toarrest authority under Fourth Amendment); INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 338, 342
(2001) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1794 English statute to interpret Suspension
Clause; disputing significance of 1811 English case but not questioning timeliness);
United States v. Hubbell, 530 U.S. 27, 50 n.1 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring) (citing
1808 English case to interpret Self-Incrimination Clause); Carter, 525 U.S. at 94
(Scalia, J., concurring) (citing 1815 English case to interpret Fourth Amendment);
Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 515-16 (Scalia, J.) (citing nineteenth-century English cases to
establish absence of exception to jury-trial right); Wilson, 514 U.S. at 935-36 (Thomas,
J.) (citing early nineteenth-century English cases to interpret Fourth Amendment
knock-and-announce rule); McLaughlin, 500 U.S. at 61 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing
1825 English case to interpret pretrial detention authority under Fourth Amendment);
Grady, 495 U.S. at 532-33 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 1796 English case to interpret
Double Jeopardy Clause); cf. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 504-05 (2004) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (citing twentieth-century English case on common-law territorial scope of
the writ); Stogner v. California, 539 U.S. 607, 644-45 (2003) (Kennedy, J., dissenting,
joined by Scalia and Thomas, JJ.) (citing 1829 English statute to interpret Ex Post
Facto Clause); Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J.)
(citing nineteenth-century English cases to interpret Self-Incrimination Clause); Grupo
Mexicano de Desarrollo S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 327-29 & n.10
(1999) (Scalia, J.) (citing nineteenth- and twentieth-century English cases on commonlaw equity jurisdiction). Not included are countless citations to nineteenth-century
editions of earlier English works.
270
See Deck v. Missouri, 544 U.S. 622, 626 (2005); id. at 639 n.2 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 433; Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 127 (1999)
(plurality); Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 356 (1996); United States v. Dixon, 509
U.S. 688, 710 (1993); Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 446-47 (1992); Grady, 495
U.S. at 532 (Scalia, J., dissenting); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 673 (1984)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 463 n.1 (1970)
(Burger, J., dissenting); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 59 (1899); Bram v. United
States, 168 U.S. 532, 547, 551 (1897); Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 240
(1895); Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 496 (1890); In re Palliser, 136 U.S. 257, 26566 (1890); Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417, 422-23 (1885); Coleman v. Tennessee, 97 U.S.
509, 530 (1878) (Clifford, J., dissenting); Ex parte Wells, 59 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1855); cf.
Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 55 (1895); Hopt v. People, 110 U.S. 574, 584 (1884).
271
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 240.
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inference is that his definition of relevant evidence is too
narrow.
While the pre-framing evidence is ambiguous in this
case, the post-framing evidence is devastating. Every reported
American decision to address the issue conditioned the
admissibility of a committal examination on presence, and in
most cases expressly on opportunity to cross-examine.272 None
of those cases contains the slightest hint that it is departing
from past practice or creating new law; indeed, with one
exception,273 none even shows any awareness that the point was
ever debatable in England. Furthermore, none of the cases
actually excluded a committal examination taken ex parte.
Rather, they all involved either (1) an attempt by a defendant
to exclude a committal examination even though he was
present and had an opportunity to cross-examine,274 or (2) an
attempt by a prosecutor to admit an ex parte deposition that
was not a committal examination.275 If framing-era criminal
defendants were routinely sequestered or prohibited to ask
questions at their own committal hearings, surely there would
be some reported case either excluding a committal deposition
or admitting it over the objection that it was taken ex parte.
That there is neither is compelling evidence that committal
examinations were routinely taken in a manner that respected
the prisoner’s right to confrontation. Only when a prosecutor
sought to invoke a committal statute in a non-committal
context, or when a prisoner sought to exclude even a properly
taken committal deposition, did it become necessary to confirm
the cross-examination rule.

272

See cases cited supra note 13.
State v. Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) 607, 609 (App. L. 1835) (noting a “great
diversity of opinion on the question” and citing Eriswell).
274
See United States v. Macomb, 26 F. Cas. 1132, 1132 (C.C.D. Ill. 1851) (No.
15,702); Davis v. State, 17 Ala. 354, 356 (1850); Tharp v. State, 15 Ala. 749, 750 (1849);
Commonwealth v. Richards, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 434, 437 (1836); State v. Houser, 26
Mo. 431, 438 (1858); State v. McO’Blenis, 24 Mo. 402, 402-03 (1857); People v. Restell, 3
Hill 289, 292-93 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1842); State v. Moody, 3 N.C. (2 Hayw.) 31, 31-32
(Super. L. 1798); Kendrick v. State, 29 Tenn. (10 Hum.) 479, 484, 487 (1850); Bostick v.
State, 22 Tenn. (3 Hum.) 344, 344 (1842); Johnston v. State, 10 Tenn. (2 Yer.) 58, 58
(1821); State v. Hooker, 17 Vt. 658, 662 (1845).
275
See Collier v. State, 13 Ark. 676, 677 (1853) (warrant application); State v.
Webb, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 103 (Super. L. 1794) (unclear, but apparently not a committal
examination, see Davies, supra note 5, at 181 & n.237); State v. Campbell, 30 S.C.L. (1
Rich.) 124, 124-25 (App. L. 1844) (coroner’s deposition); Hill, 20 S.C.L. (2 Hill) at 608
(warrant application).
273
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Text

Finally, we should not lose sight of what the Sixth
Amendment actually says: “In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him . . . .”276 As Professor Davies observes,
the Framers clearly would have understood those who gave
sworn testimony against a prisoner at his committal hearing to
be “witnesses against him” within the meaning of that clause.277
Indeed, the full phrase “accusers and witnesses” that appeared
in some state confrontation clauses278 and in Madison’s original
draft of the federal clause279 was the same phrase Hale used to
describe Marian deponents.280
Taking a Marian deposition outside the presence of the
prisoner and then using that ex parte deposition to convict him
at trial deprives the defendant of the opportunity “to be
confronted with the witnesses against him” under any
conceivable literal interpretation of those words. And denying
the prisoner the opportunity to question the witness deprives
him of the principal benefit that the English confrontational
manner of giving testimony was thought to secure. By
contrast, if admissibility is subject to the appropriate
conditions, “[t]he substance of the constitutional protection is
preserved to the prisoner in the advantage he has once had of
seeing the witness face to face, and of subjecting him to the
ordeal of a cross-examination.”281 Those are not irrelevant
considerations.
Professor Davies declines to undertake any textual
parsing of the Confrontation Clause because it “drew upon
settled understandings of legal rights.”282 The “right . . . to be

276

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Davies, supra note 5, at 193.
278
See Virginia Declaration of Rights § 8 (1776) (“[I]n all capital or criminal
prosecutions a man hath a right . . . to be confronted with the accusers and
witnesses . . . .”), reprinted in 1 BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 234, 235 (1971); Delaware Declaration of Rights § 14 (1776)
(“[I]n all prosecutions for criminal offences, every man hath a right . . . to be confronted
with the accusers or witnesses . . . .”), reprinted in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra, at 276, 278.
279
See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 423 (Richard Perry & John Cooper eds.,
rev. ed. 1978) (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be
confronted with his accusers, and the witnesses against him . . . .”).
280
See 2 HALE, supra note 23, at 284 (directing magistrates to take
“informations of the accusers and witnesses”); id. at 52 (similar).
281
Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895).
282
Davies, supra note 5, at 105 n.1.
277
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confronted with the witnesses against him,” in other words,
secures only whatever content that “right” had at common law.
That interpretive method is sound so far as it goes, but it
presumes the existence of a “settled understanding” on which
to operate. If nothing else, this Article has shown that the
admissibility of ex parte committal examinations was far from
settled.
The Framers were invoking what they understood to be
pre-existing legal rights, but they were also using the English
language to describe those rights; and when the content of the
right invoked is unclear or was disputed, we should not ignore
their description of it. It is one thing to read a common-law
exception into the text where that exception was
noncontroversial in England and consistently followed in
America after the framing (as, for example, with dying
declarations283). But it is quite another where the exception
was disputed in England and consistently rejected here.
V.

CONCLUSION

Throughout the eighteenth century, it was settled law
that a Marian deposition was admissible at trial if the witness
was dead, too sick to travel, or kept away by the accused.
Nevertheless, Marian procedure was evolving.
The
development was not that courts began excluding depositions
where they once admitted them, but that Marian procedure
came to be (or be seen as) consistent with the crossexamination rule. It would have been strange, at the outset of
the century, to say that “[t]he substance of the constitutional
protection is preserved to the prisoner”284 in the advantages he
enjoyed at Marian pretrial. Not so at the end.
The presence of the prisoner was clearly a routine
feature of Marian committal practice. Presence was a natural
consequence of the procedure the statutes contemplated—
indeed, of any committal procedure. That routine feature
hardened into a procedural right, so that an examination
conducted in the prisoner’s absence was deemed outside the
statutes and so not admissible. How long before the framing
that occurred is hard to say, since there was little occasion to
consider the matter until prosecutors tried to invoke the
283
See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 56 n.6 (2004); 3 WIGMORE, supra
note 49, §§ 1430-1452, at 160-87.
284
Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
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statutes to admit depositions unrelated to magistrates’
statutory committal function.
Whether a prisoner could cross-examine witnesses at
his committal hearing was probably an almost entirely
theoretical question until the second half of the eighteenth
century.
It was put into relief once magistrates began
exercising an extra-statutory power of discharge (increasing
the incentive to test the prosecutor’s case) and lawyers began
participating (increasing the likelihood that any opportunity to
cross-examine would be exploited). The idea that a prisoner
had the right to cross-examine witnesses at his committal
hearing gained currency before the framing, but some
magistrates resisted, and the point was still disputed when the
Confrontation Clause was framed.285
That said, there are compelling reasons to think the
framing generation’s views on this point coincided more with
Garrow’s than with Buller’s.286 The cross-examination rule was
followed in a wide range of other contexts. Courts across the
United States uniformly endorsed it after the framing. And the
rule is more consistent with the text of the Confrontation
Clause itself.
Crawford ’s cross-examination rule is therefore on solid
ground.287 If the opinion is to be faulted for anything, it is only
for understating the importance of physical presence, not for
overstating the importance of cross-examination.288 At the
285
I therefore disagree with Landsman’s claim that “[b]efore the early
nineteenth century, the most that was ever called for was physical confrontation
between witness and accused.” Landsman, supra note 76, at 599. The crossexamination rule may have been settled in the nineteenth century, but it originated in
the eighteenth.
286
Compare supra notes 165-78 and accompanying text with supra notes 12844 and accompanying text.
287
Professor Davies thinks I advocate a position much weaker than Justice
Scalia’s in Crawford. See Davies, supra note 10, at 573-77. But even Justice Scalia
acknowledged “doubts” over whether the Marian statutes prescribed an exception to
the common-law cross-examination rule, citing among other authorities Lofft’s 1791
edition of Gilbert and Grose and Kenyon’s 1790 opinions in Eriswell. See Crawford,
541 U.S. at 46. Admittedly, near the end of a lengthy footnote responding to Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the opinion also states that three particular sources (Hale,
Westbeer, and Eriswell) did not show that the law in 1791 was “unsettled.” Id. at 55
n.5. To the extent that sentence implies that the question was settled beyond all
dispute, I agree it takes a position stronger than the one I take here. I also concede
that, whatever its demerits, Buller’s opinion in Eriswell does show that the issue was
still debated. But I do not think those differences are as substantial as Davies makes
them out to be. A framing-era legal rule need not be settled beyond dispute to be
relevant to original meaning, so long as there are adequate reasons to believe the
Framers would have resolved the dispute a particular way.
288
Cf. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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framing, the right “to be confronted with the witnesses against
him” was the right to be testified against in one’s presence;
opportunity for cross-examination was not so much the
confrontation right itself as the reason that right was secured
(at least the principal one). That formulation changed over
time so that, by 1824, Starkie could write simply that “the
depositions of witnesses before magistrates, under the statutes
of Philip and Mary, are not evidence, unless the prisoner had
an opportunity to cross-examine those witnesses,” without even
mentioning presence.289 The change, however, was more of
emphasis than of substance.
Professor Davies’ article is objectionable, not because of
the contrary conclusion he reaches, but because of his repeated
dismissals of the opposing view as historical “fiction”—at one
point going so far as to compare Justice Scalia’s opinion to
“junk science.”290 Davies’ conclusion, however, rests critically
on his premise that all English sources published after 1789
and all American sources published more than a few years
after 1789 are irrelevant to original meaning; relax either of
those two constraints and his argument unravels. Even if
those novel constraints were defensible (which I doubt), the
fact that Justice Scalia took a somewhat broader view of the
post-framing evidence relevant to original meaning hardly
makes his opinion “fictional.”291
One suspects Davies chose the rhetorical style he did to
justify his more general critique of originalism. It was not
enough for him to show that Crawford resolved a debatable
point over which reasonable legal historians could disagree; he
had to show that Crawford ’s history was so flawed that it was
not even worth undertaking the inquiry. With respect, I do not
believe he made that case; but I will let readers judge for
themselves.
289
1 STARKIE, supra note 11, at *96. Later formulations of the confrontation
right likewise emphasized cross-examination over presence. See, e.g., 3 WIGMORE,
supra note 49, § 1397, at 100 (“There never was at common law any recognized right to
an indispensable thing called Confrontation as distinguished from Cross-examination.”
(emphasis omitted)); FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(1).
290
Davies, supra note 5, at 216.
291
I have focused this Article on the core issue of the cross-examination rule’s
applicability to Marian examinations, rather than attempting to respond
comprehensively to all of Davies’ other alleged “errors.” That limitation should not be
taken as acquiescence. In particular, I have not addressed the validity of Crawford ’s
testimonial/nontestimonial distinction, because that topic has already been well
addressed by other authors. See, e.g., Richard Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L.J. 1011 (1998).

